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Since	 its	 launch	 in	November	 2020,	 I	 am	pleased	 to	 say	 that	 the	 country’s	 new	National	 Disaster	
Management	Agency	 (NDMA)	has	continued	 to	cooperate	with	 the	Centre	and	with	Professor	Lee	







































































The	advantage	of	 focusing	on	SPOF	 is	 that	 it	 is	 a	 key	approach	 that	 is	easily	understood	by	both	academics	and	
practitioners	alike	and	indeed,	offers	a	common	dialogue	and	agenda	on	which	to	base	future	actions	now	and	in	the	



















The Driving African Capacity-Building in 
Disaster Management (AFRICAB) Final Report 
recognises that significant progress has been 
made in recent years aimed at improving the 
disaster management (DM) system of Sierra 
Leone, including the passing of new legislation 
in 2020, the establishment of a dedicated 
National Disaster Management Agency 
(NDMA) in November 2020 and the continuing 
development of a successful pillar-system 
for the coordination of disaster response. 
There have also been further initiatives in 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) planning and 
investments in early warning systems (EWS). 
Major progress has also been made at the local 
level, including new initiatives by Freetown 
City Council (FCC) to develop new standard 
operating procedures for disaster response and 
the creation of minimum training requirements 
for local councillors and disaster managers 
since 2020. Nevertheless, using innovative 
Single Points of Failure (SPOF) diagnostics and 
techniques, refined at Bournemouth University 
Disaster Management Centre (BUDMC) and 
based on research involving 559 participants 
over the period September 2018 to July 2021, 
this Final Report also confirms that there 
remain many relatively manageable areas, 
such as technical, procedural, human, physical 
and economic issues that have large and 
detrimental consequences for effective DM 
in Sierra Leone. This AFRICAB Final Report 
highlights that:
• There are numerous areas where SPOF 
still exist that inhibit the implementation 
of effective DRR.
• There are 12 notable areas where 
SPOF exist that are likely to lead to 
the breakdown of part of or all of the 
DM system, particularly during disaster 
response and recovery.
ES
• There are areas of SPOF that are clearly 
and commonly identifiable by both 
national and local actors and stakeholders 
and thus there is a firm basis for concerted 
future action and initiatives.
• There is also strong agreement among 
national and local actors and stakeholders 
that the 12 identified areas of SPOF 
are interlinked. They have severe and 
scalable consequences damaging both the 
effectiveness of one area of action and 
also impacting negatively across the many 
areas of the DM system simultaneously.
• There is a remarkably high level of 
consistency and consensus between 
national and local actors and stakeholders 
as to the top SPOF areas and also those 
that are resolvable and fixable over the 
short to medium term (within 5 years). 
There is also then a notable consensus on 
which to build future action and initiatives.
This AFRICAB Final Report offers 8 
recommendations for future action focusing 
on addressing technical, coordination, 
communication, capacity-building, procedural, 
human, physical and economic areas of 
SPOF. Each of these recommendations also 
includes specific and immediate action 
points for consideration by policymakers and 
stakeholders in Sierra Leone.
By focusing on practical initiatives, the 
intention is that this AFRICAB Final Report 
can contribute in helping national and 
local disaster managers, policymakers and 
stakeholders on their journey towards further 






Sierra Leone, a small West African country with 
a rich and complex history, is simultaneously 
grappling with numerous challenges from a 
DM perspective.
On an annual basis, the country endures a dry 
season (November to April) that brings with it 
hazardous incidents of bush and urban fires 
as well as acute water shortages, and a rainy 
season (May to October), fuelled by one of the 
highest propensities for rainfall in Africa, that 
presents recurrent challenges of flash floods, 
mudslides and land slippage. The capital of 
Freetown as well as many of the country’s 
other major urban conurbations have suffered 
significant flooding in recent years. In addition, 
Freetown’s topography makes it vulnerable 
to experiencing landslips and mudslides. The 
most recent example of this was the mudslide 
incident in Regent in 2017 that led to the 
estimated loss of over 1,000 lives. 
Moreover, with a poverty stricken and rapidly 
expanding population, combined with porous 
borders with neighbouring Liberia and Guinea, 
the country has also experienced major health-
related emergencies. For instance, Sierra Leone 
was one of the countries worst affected by the 
2014–2016 outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease 
(EVD) in West Africa, which was the largest and 
most complex Ebola outbreak since the virus 
was first discovered in 1976. There were more 
cases and deaths in this outbreak than in all 
others combined. Most recently, the country 
has endured waves of outbreaks of COVID-19, 
with a 12-month state of national emergency 
declared in March 2020.
Alongside this, the country is also at the 
forefront of experiencing direct and indirect 
impacts of climate change, that bring 
stronger likelihoods of drought, fires and 
water shortages during the dry season and of 
flooding during the rainy season. The situation 
is best summarised as one of an expanding 
population facing an increasing frequency of 
emergencies throughout the year. Thus the 
demands on the country’s nascent and evolving 
DM system and its officials are onerous and 
continue to grow (Miles, 2020).
For the most part, however, efforts to adopt 
western-style models of DM have been 
much less successful than would at first 
appear. In general, the adoption of western-
derived frameworks that often require 
sophisticated institutional arrangements, 
expensive financing, and intensive human 
capital resourcing and maintenance, do 
not sit well in developing countries where 
resources are scarce and institutional systems 
remain nascent. Above all, there is a need for 
any DM system adopted in Sierra Leone to 
recognise the varied situation that pertains 
in the country, including a very diverse 
cultural environment, a complex political 
climate, differing social atmospheres, and 
the challenges of scarce financial, social and 
human resources. These factors ultimately 
combine to ensure that DM in Sierra Leone 
has tended to be more reactive and focused 
on responding to changing events rather than 










Contemporary challenges confronting DM 
officials and stakeholders in Sierra Leone are 
extensive and almost seem too numerous or 
frequent to bear. Moreover, potential solutions 
are often assumed to lie beyond the reach of 
the often very capable hands of the country’s 
disaster managers. Nonetheless, it is also the 
case that many of these challenges can still 
be resolved and lie within the operational 
realities of the existing DM capabilities 
and capacities of Sierra Leone. However, 
these challenges, if not resolved, are likely 
to lead to major failures and thus require 
urgent attention and action, especially where 
preventative solutions are within everyday 
reach of much of the population.
Sierra Leone faces a wide array of risk 
and vulnerability to both natural and 
anthropogenic disasters. Thus, the AFRICAB 
project also assumed an ‘all-hazards approach,’ 
focusing on an analysis of the DM system 
covering a wide variety of challenges, hazards 
and threats. The high concentration of a 
large proportion of the country’s population 
(an estimated eight million in 2020) in the 
rapidly expanding Freetown and western 
peninsula area also heightens vulnerabilities 
since the urban expansion has been largely 
unregulated. Freetown’s 68 fire and flood-
prone informal settlements (including 
numerous hillside communities that are 
vulnerable to landslides) can easily become 
isolated and/or cut off from governmental 
and responder services (see Miles, 2021). The 
country is also afflicted with high levels of 
poverty1, with communities often suffering 
from weak infrastructures and limited and/
or lack of access to safe sources of electricity 
or potable water. At the same time, the DM 
system, providers and indigenous stakeholders 
are often insufficiently resourced to meet these 
numerous and annual challenges. In fact, they 
are highly “resource challenged” in terms of 
infrastructure, equipment and manpower. DM 
capabilities, as well as spending on emergency 
responders, have traditionally been a relatively 
low priority and often rely on the generosity of 
international donors.
1
¹ Sierra Leone continues to be designated as a least developed country (LDC) by the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
“Sierra 
Leone faces 
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In Sierra Leone, DM is distinctive. Sierra Leone’s 
DM system is required to accommodate a 
complex array of components, including 
multiple levels of decision-making, along with 
a wide variety of stakeholders, all of whom are 
drawn from a rich tapestry of social groups 
reflecting a diversity of ethnic, linguistic, 
religious and regional backgrounds, and 
corresponding variations in local perspectives 
as to their specific vulnerabilities.
This complexity is added to by national 
governmental structures where political 
rivalries can hinder the effectiveness of day-to-
day governance and risk reduction. In addition, 
a culture of decision-making being pushed 
up to the highest levels and an aversion to 
delegating authority and to risk-taking can 
dominate and delay crisis response to the 
detriment of autonomy at more operational 
levels and to timely and effective action in 
response to a crisis or disaster. Furthermore, 
regular political elections can lead to 
significant changes in key personnel which in 
turn affect levels of available DM experience 
and expertise.
Nevertheless, the importance of DM is 
formally recognized at nation state level and 
there have been progressive developments 
to improve the legislative frameworks 
underpinning the DM system in Sierra Leone. 
A succession of legislative acts have been 
passed and a framework has been developed 
that continues to improve the DM apparatus 
and structures in the country. Most recently, 
and during the delivery of this project, 
Parliament approved new legislation (the 
2020 National Disaster Management Agency 
Act) that seeks to enhance the planning 
and coordination capacity at the national 
governmental level and improve DRR in line 
with UN Sendai Framework commitments. The 
subsequent creation of the new, dedicated and 
independent National Disaster Management 
Agency (NDMA), launched in November 2020, 
embodies a greater enthusiasm to refine DM 
planning and delivery at the nation state level.
Indeed, it is important to recognise that 
substantial progress has continued to be made 
in improving the DM system over recent years. 
Indicative examples include:
• Expansions in physical capacity. The 
development of the new NDMA has been 
supported with World Bank financing 
that has enabled the NDMA to open a 
dedicated building in Freetown in 2021.
• Major investments in data management and 
information technology (IT) systems, such as 
Open Data Kits (ODK), phones, and tablets 
to improve data collection capacities 
supported by the start of related training 
of stakeholders in 2021.
• Improvements in DRR planning, including 
the devising of specific medium term plans 
for DRR, preparedness and response at the 
national and local levels in 2021 (NDMA, 
2021).
• Ongoing enhancement of early warning 
capacities, such as strategic investments 
(new remote sensing, hardware and 
10
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software packages funded by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP)) 
in the capacity of the Sierra Leone 
Meteorological Agency (SLMet) in July 
2021 to assist climate and oceanographic 
monitoring.
• Continual refinements to disaster response 
arrangements by the NDMA, including, for 
instance, the pillar coordination system for 
disaster response that was implemented 
successfully during the Susan’s Bay fire 
incident in March 2021. There have also 
been notable initiatives at the local 
level, especially in the case of Freetown, 
to enhance local DM capacities since 
2020 that, for example, enabled FCC to 
successfully handle 14 major fire incidents 
in Spring 2021.
• A stronger focus on recovery. This has 
included the implementation of After-
Action Reviews (AARs), coordinated by 
the NDMA, to identify important lessons 
from incidents and emergences. There 
have also been positive developments 
in coordinating recovery planning 
between national and district ministries, 
departments and agencies, as evidenced 
with the workings of the Technical Working 
Group (TWG) that considered integrated 
options for the recovery of Susan’s Bay in 
April-May 2021.
The transition to an enhanced DM system is 
thus clearly underway. In 2021, Sierra Leone’s 
emergency management professionals are 
committed to further improvements and 
harnessing greater financial investment 
in disaster management. In addition, the 
country is the recipient of significant levels of 
international aid and is involved in extensive 
international cooperation, both bilaterally 
and multilaterally. However, there remains 
a need for strong national leadership and 
commitment to ensure that such commitment 












This AFRICAB Research Final Report, led by 
Professor Lee Miles from the BUDMC and 
funded by the United Kingdom (UK)’s Global 
Challenges Research Fund (GCRF), is based 
upon a comprehensive set of critical data 
developed from detailed ground-research 
visits and key interviews on the architecture, 
organizational structures and performance 
of Sierra Leone’s DM system over the period 
2018-2021.
Aim: The aim of this AFRICAB Final Report 
is to present findings, reflections and 
recommendations that address the identified 
local and urgent needs that have been 
repeatedly expressed by national and local 
disaster managers in Sierra Leone.
Objectives:
1. To offer research findings that are 
compatible with demands in Sierra Leone 
to meet and move forward with UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
2. To provide findings and reflections that 
can inform actions and further refine the 
activities of policymakers in Sierra Leone 
as they seek to identify deficiencies and 
offer solutions that will improve DM 
governance and capacity (SDG 16.A).
3. To generate practical recommendations 
that can contribute to increasing the 
agility of policymakers through research, 
knowledge exchange and co-creation with 
partners in Sierra Leone.
Structure
The AFRICAB Final Report is made up of five 
chapters. Chapter 1 provides an Introduction 
whilst Chapter 2 presents the Concepts, 
Methodology and Methods that underpin 
the research findings. Chapter 3 presents the 
key selected findings and results that have 
pertinence for national and local policymakers 
in Sierra Leone. Chapter 4 considers the 
categorisation of resolvable SPOF for future 
action to deliver quick and timely wins.








A distinctive feature of the AFRICAB project 
is that it seeks to present findings based on 
a clear identification of the main challenges 
that exist in the DM systems and practices 
currently in place in Sierra Leone using a SPOF 
diagnostic analysis. Chapter Two introduces the 
underpinning definitions as well as the main 
conceptual and diagnostic analytic tools that 
act as key lenses when interpreting the data.
Concepts
Two principal concepts underpin the analysis 
undertaken in this AFRICAB Final Report. These 
concepts are referred to as ‘Main Challenges’ 
(MC) and ‘Single Points of Failure’ (SPOF):
MC refer to the identification of issues and/
or areas that have impacted or will impact 
substantially on the full functioning of the 
DM system now or in the future. These MC are 
perceived by disaster managers as notable 
in influencing both the development and 
the delivery of fully functioning disaster 
management. MC are intrinsically linked to 
levels of functioning.
SPOF refer to a specific failure within a place 
(situation/location), entity (organization, team 
or individual) or process (policy, plan, process 
or procedure) leading to the breakdown or 
paralysis of part or all of the DM system at 
any point in time in the DM cycle. It takes the 
analysis of MC a step further, since it highlights 
those deficiencies that also have extreme 
criticality; namely a SPOF has a very strong 
likelihood and a high propensity for failure of 
part or all of the DM system itself. 
SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE
(SPOF) DEFINITION
Specific failures within a place (situa-
tion or location), entity (organisation, 
team or individual) or process (policy 
or procedure) leading to the break-
down or paralysis of part or all of the 
DM system at any point in time in the 
DM cycle.
SPOF are intrinsically linked to failures (see 
breakout box).
As a technical approach, SPOF diagnostics and 
techniques initially arose from the fields of 
supply chain management (Lynch, 2009) and 
the interconnected study of resources and IT 
management (Wolf, 2004). SPOF have now 
achieved wider recognition in terms of fields of 
governance and are central to identifying and 
reducing resistance and extreme criticality to 
resilience building (Bang, Miles and Gordon, 
2018; 2019a; 2019b; Hempel et al., 2018).
The value-added effect of understanding those 
areas and issues of a DM system that represent 
potential or real SPOF is that it is possible 
to indicate those MC that are so extreme 
that they have highly disproportionate and 
detrimental effects on DM governance, systems 
and practice. SPOF are so critical that they can 
have sizeable, dramatic and paralyzing effects 
on part or all of the DM system covering part 







Put simply, they are likely to result in failures. 
So while there can be numerous MC that can 
impact on the functioning of DM to various 
degrees, we need to go beyond this. We need to 
delve deeper into those MC that are also real 
or potential SPOF and have a strong likelihood 
of resulting in the part or complete failure of 
the DM system in Sierra Leone.
The value of the SPOF diagnostic tool is 
that not only is it academically robust, 
but also that it provides an accessible 
conceptual framework that can be commonly 
understood by policymakers. SPOF concepts 
and diagnostics have also been proven by 
the BUDMC within their externally funded 
research into DM elsewhere in Africa as well as 
in the Caribbean. This report therefore draws 
upon a proven diagnostic framework that can 
Figure 2.1: AFRICAB Conceptual Process of SPOF Diagnostics 
give policymakers quality assurance that the 
recommendations offered in this report are 
based on a peer-reviewed and tried and tested 
process of analysis and diagnosis.
There is therefore considerable merit in 
employing SPOF concepts to inform technical 
assistance within DM operating systems and 
for relevant organisations and stakeholders. 
Understanding and addressing specific SPOF 
is especially helpful when general levels of 
resourcing remain scarce, challenging and 
highly dependent on limited reservoirs of 
technological, social and human capability. 
By recognising SPOF, and thereby tailoring 
the subsequent policy actions, there is an 
enhanced possibility of turning current failure 
into future success (see Figure 2.1).
DISTINCTIVE AFRICAN
DISASTER MANAGEMENT MAIN
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Figure 2.2: Forms of SPOF²
It is important to highlight that not only can 
the use of SPOF diagnostics inform and assist 
disaster managers to handle the real and 
tangible challenges confronting them in Sierra 
Leone, but it can also help to focus on and 
identify the respective control measures that 
can remove or resolve SPOF or, at least, seek to 
alleviate and reduce the inherent risks of SPOF.
Control measures need to focus on addressing 
particular forms of SPOF. As Figure 2.2 
indicates, SPOF can take numerous forms, 
including:
Failures in the omission, existence, aims, 
objectives, format, description, 
implementation and enforcement of policy 
and/or legal framework.
Procedural
Failures in the omission, existence, format, 
description, implementation, 
interoperability & enforcement of 
standards.
Technical
Single Points of Failure that relate to human 
error & deciencies arising from sta 
numbers & resilience, issues, seniority & 
leadership issues, expertise, competence, 
skills & training issues.
Human
Failure of critical infrastructure, buildings & 
estates, communications, transport system, 
tools, equipment, vehicles, geographical 
locations, climate & geology etc.
Physical
Budgets & allocations, short & long term 






² Note: Alongside identification of SPOF form there is a need to consider interrelationships. SPOF forms are often 
highly interlinked.
Methodology
The methodology supporting this AFRICAB 
Final Report can be likened to a combination 
of two ‘Lenses’.
Lens 1: The first lens comprises the Main 
Challenges (MC) analysis. This identifies and 
categorises the various types of challenges 
facing Sierra Leone’s DM system that are 
regarded by disaster managers, policymakers 
and key stakeholders as impacting to various 
degrees on the DM system and/or competency 
framework in the country. The authors 
gathered information and data from disaster 
managers and stakeholders country-wide at 
both the national and local levels on their 
risk perceptions, as well as interpretations of 
existing general and specific challenges.
Lens 2: The second lens comprises the 
SPOF analysis where the disaster managers, 
policymakers and stakeholders were asked 
to identify and comment upon potential and 
real SPOF guided by diagnostic concepts 
developed as part of Bournemouth University’s 
inductive SPOF approach. This diagnostic tool 
assists disaster managers to understand the 
impacts of SPOF and how better to develop 
strategies and control measures to confront 
and handle them. This builds on the initial 
challenge-based analysis by identifying and 
defining the specific deficiencies that have 
disproportionately large and detrimental 
impacts and could lead to failures within Sierra 
Leone’s DM system.
Essentially, it is important to recognise 
that not all SPOF are perceived by disaster 
managers and stakeholders as having the 
same likelihood and/or severity of impact. In 
simple terms, some SPOF are deemed to have 
a greater likelihood of happening and would 
have more severe implications for a particular 
area of disaster management. For example, 
16
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Figure 2.3: Severity & Scalability
the destruction of mobile phone masts on 
the hills of Freetown due to high winds or 
rainfall induced landslides will lead to major 
‘dead spots’ in the communication network 
that will make communication in that part of 
the capital highly difficult given the lack of 
other alternatives. Hence, perceptions of the 
determinants of a SPOF include understanding 
estimations of their severity within one area of 
DM activity.
In addition, how scalable a SPOF is perceived 
to be is also significant in terms of the ability 
of that specific failure in one area to transcend 
and lead to major accompanying challenges 
and failures in other parts of the DM system. 
Thus the loss of mobile phone connectivity 
and capacity will impact not just on the 
communication network, but also could lead 
to scalable failures that transcend into other 
areas of disaster management; so if disaster 
responders are heavily reliant on mobile 
phones for communication then this will 
inhibit the speed, response and coordination of 
the emergency services. In other words, SPOF 
are assessed in terms of their severity and of 
their scalability:
• Severity. The degree to which a SPOF 
affects an area of the DM system and the 
extent to which it will in itself lead to the 
breakdown of part or all of the system 
(vertical – within an area/policy field).
• Scalability. The degree to which a 
SPOF in one part of the DM system has 
repercussions that scale and transfer 
across to other parts and domains of 
the DM system, that may in turn lead to 
an eventual breakdown of that system 












As part of Lens 2, participants were asked to 
comment upon SPOF utilising two differing 
typologies. The first focuses on the size of 
the SPOF by determining the degrees of 
perceived severity and scalability of any SPOF 
(Determinants of SPOF). The second focuses 
on its ability to be addressed or ‘fixed’ using 
appropriate control measures (Categories of 
SPOF).
Perceptions of the severity and scalability 
of a particular SPOF by respective disaster 
managers and stakeholders will also influence 
to what extent they regard and estimate the 
extent to which a SPOF can be resolved (partly 
or completely) by the proper implementation 
of existing control measures or by the 
introduction of new control measures and 
solutions.
Put simply, this indicates whether a SPOF can 
be fixed, partly fixed or will remain unfixed 
by the actions of disaster managers and 
respective stakeholders working together to 
enhance Sierra Leone’s DM system. Thus SPOF 
are categorised as follows:
Temporary:




Can only be partly removed via 




Cannot be removed - management 
strategies based on accepting their 





Figure 2.4: Categories of SPOF
• Resolvable (Fixable): SPOF that are 
categorised as ‘Resolvable’ can be regarded 
as temporary in nature since if appropriate 
resources and control measures are 
implemented or put in place then either 
or both the severity and scalability of a 
SPOF can be removed and thus the SPOF 
is resolved. Under this reasoning, the 
key strategies for addressing Resolvable 
SPOF are usually based on mitigation and 
removal.
• Residual (Partly Fixable): SPOF that 
are categorised as ‘Residual’ are more 
complex and multi-faceted. Residual SPOF 
can be reduced and/or removed only in 
part through the implementation of key 
strategies and control measures, leaving 
an enduring ‘residual’ element which 
governments and their disaster managers 
need to be constantly aware of and seek to 
mitigate.
• Resistant (Unfixable): SPOF that are 
categorised as ‘Resistant’ should be 
regarded as impervious to strategies and 
measures that seek their removal and are 
therefore regarded as permanent in their 
entirety and cannot be removed at all. 
Consequently, the management strategies 
to handle Resistant SPOF are often based 
around recognising and accepting their 
existence. These strategies are usually then 
based on acknowledging the Resistant 
SPOF as an extreme form of vulnerability, 
implementing limited risk reduction 
where it is feasible, and reconciling the 
boundaries where the SPOF will have 
a catastrophic impact in terms of the 





The AFRICAB Final Report employed a variety 
of mixed research methods to support and 
underpin the respective ‘Lens’ methodology 
(see Figure 2.5). This comprehensive and 
country-wide data collection process 
collectively incorporated detailed qualitative 
inputs and insights from 559 participants and 
stakeholders at the national, regional and local 
levels of DM. There was also participation from 
across the ‘triple-helix’ of the Government/
Public, Private, and Third Sectors, including 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The 
AFRICAB research process was also able to 
incorporate the challenges of the coronavirus 
disease (COVID-19) lockdowns and provide 
further insight into the impact of handling 
disasters and emergencies in a COVID-19 
environment.
Phase 1
Literature Review: The completion of an 
extensive literature review/document survey 
of over 75 existing primary and secondary 
materials and resources to support the 
application of the MC analysis. Initial 
consultative workshops with national 
stakeholders were also held in September 
2018 in order to provide early insights into the 
main challenges and to ensure stakeholder 
involvement and co-creation in the AFRICAB 
research design.
Stakeholder and Partner Benchmarking and 
Co-creation: Initial stakeholder meetings 
took place in September 2018. These were 
organized under the auspices of the Disaster 
Management Department (DMD) in the Office 
of National Security (ONS) with representation 
from over 30 stakeholders including 
Government Ministries of Health and of Social 
Affairs, local authorities (for example, FCC), 
public agencies (such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA)), utilities and services, 
such as airport and port authorities, as well 
as responders such as the National Fire Force 
(NFF), the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) and the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). 
These meetings were designed to ensure 
stakeholder benchmarking and inputs into the 
design and execution of the initial AFRICAB 
research and field work.
Field Research: A country-wide qualitative 
research investigation process took place 
across Sierra Leone during March 2019. This 
involved a total of 104 national and local 
disaster managers and stakeholders in four 
major centres of population (Freetown, Bo, 
Kenema and Makeni) taking part in semi-
structured, detailed one-hour interviews (12) 
and three three-hour dedicated focus groups 
(88). This was followed by a small set of 
one-to-one interviews in Freetown in January 
2020 (4). The completion of interviews and 
focus groups provided a field research base-
line data set to investigate the identification, 
categorisation and prevalence of SPOF and 
to provide key data in relation to the SPOF 
analysis.
Figure 2.5: Methodology and Methods 
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Peer-Review Workshops: The initial field 
research investigation was consolidated 
through the organisation of eleven 
additional benchmarking events over the 
period 2019-2021 involving a total of 455 
participants. These were a series of peer-
review and feedback events and workshops 
designed and organised to further inform 
research findings, accommodate practitioner 
perspectives towards the data and verify 
the SPOF diagnostic analysis. They included 
four peer-review sessions with 80 further 
national stakeholders in March 2019, May 
2019, September 2019 and January 2020 as 
well as seven additional online workshops 
in Freetown with the participation of 375 
additional councillors, local disaster managers 
and volunteers in August 2020, March 2021 
and June 2021 to identify critical risks, locate 
obstacles and consider control measures in 
the pursuit of a robust, effective, ‘Fit-for-Threat’ 
DM system for Sierra Leone. The latter phase 
also enabled the AFRICAB research to capture 
in the data any strategic and operational 
challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
the March 2021 Susan’s Bay fire disaster in 
Freetown on the functioning of the DM system 
of the country.
National Stakeholder Observations: AFRICAB 
research also benefitted from extensive 
access to national and local agencies and 
partners responsible for DM in Sierra Leone. 
In particular, the kind cooperation of the 
(then) DMD within the ONS and now the 
newly established NDMA of the Government 
of Sierra Leone facilitated access for AFRICAB 
researchers to key DM-related documents 
and planning meetings on the ground from 
2018 onwards. The DMD was responsible for 
co-organising the field research interviews 
and focus groups in March 2019 and the 
follow-up peer-review sessions at the ONS 
in Freetown during the 2019 rainy season. 
AFRICAB attendance was also granted at the 
‘platinum level’ meetings of the National 
Platform of Disaster Risk Reduction (NPDRR) of 
the Government of Sierra Leone during 2019 
and 2020. The AFRICAB Director, Professor 
Lee Miles, also benefitted from insider 
insights in the development of the 2020 
legislation that resulted in the new February 
2020 law establishing the NDMA, which was 
subsequently launched in November 2020. 
He was also given full access to the NDMA 
response group and pillar coordination 
covering the Susan’s Bay fire disaster and the 
follow-up After Action Review (AAR) process 
(see Thornhill and Rogers, 2021). Access 
extended not just to DRR and response modes 
but also to recovery planning, with Professor 
Miles participating in the Government’s 
Technical Working Group (TWG) for the 
Recovery of Susan’s Bay in May 2021.
Local Stakeholder Observations: FCC also 
proved to be a valuable and productive partner 
of the AFRICAB project. Professor Lee Miles 
was allowed full access to the proceedings 
of the FCC’s District Disaster Management 
Committee (DDMC). AFRICAB researchers 
observed contemporary deliberations relating 
to DM arrangements, processes and procedures 
in Freetown during the period 2019-2021. In 
February 2021, Professor Miles joined the FCC’s 
‘virtual’ Emergency Response Group (bringing 
together NDMA, FCC, NGOs and stakeholders) 
that handled 14 major fire incidents in 
Freetown during the period February to May 
2021 in an ongoing evaluation role (see Miles, 
2021). The data collection and analysis of 
this report therefore also reflects the most 
contemporary and detailed insights into levels 
of situational awareness relating to Freetown’s 
fire-related emergency response operations 






Chapter 3 presents selected results and 
findings from the AFRICAB project. As described 
in the previous chapter, this involved a process 
of qualitative field research in terms of semi-
structured interviews with 16 senior ONS 
personnel and national and local stakeholders 
in Freetown and focus groups organised by 
the local DDMC with local stakeholders and 
disaster managers in Bo (40), Kenema (26) and 
Makeni (22).
This therefore represents a country-wide 
sample covering the western, southern, eastern 
and northern regions of Sierra Leone, including 
inputs from multiple stakeholders and 
representation from 104 interested parties.
The findings presented here are based on key 
inclusion criteria guiding the data selection. 
SPOF included in this chapter were:
• Commonly identified in at least one-
third (33 per cent) of the one-to-one 
semi structured interviews and interview 
transcripts.
• Commonly identified and discussed in at 
least two-thirds (66 per cent) of the focus 
groups as a minimum and frequently 
featured in all three focus groups.
• Were further verified in the peer-review 
and feedback AFRICAB workshops or in 
the participatory observations at key DM 
meetings attended by Professor Miles over 
the period 2019-21.
Overall National Findings
The findings from the 16 interviews confirm 
the clear existence of numerous identifiable 
SPOF at the national level. Overall, 47 different 
SPOF were identified by the interviewees 
suggesting that there is an extensive number 
of perceived potential SPOF within the current 
DM system in Sierra Leone. These findings 
reveal that the current, if improving, disaster 
DM system in the country is far from robust or 
resilient to potential breakdown or failures.
Indeed, 20 of the 47 SPOF (43%) were 
identified in over one third of the national 
interviewees.
There was also a high-level consensus that 
15 of the 20 most commonly identified 
SPOF (75%) were both severe and scalable 
in terms of their consequences, suggesting a 
widespread concern across national officials 
and stakeholders.
There was also a large consensus that the clear 





SPOF at the 
national level.”
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Overall Local & Regional Findings
The findings from the dedicated focus groups 
organised under the auspices of the respective 
DDMCs of the cities of Bo, Kenema and Makeni 
in March 2019 confirmed the clear existence 
of numerous identifiable SPOF at the local 
level. These focus groups consisted of DDMC 
members with a strong diversity of local actors 
and organisations including ONS District 
Officers, local officers of the EPA, departments 
of local authorities, senior officers of the NFF, 
Police and armed forces, NGO stakeholders, 
local Community Disaster Management 
Commitee (CDMC) members and volunteers.
The SPOF identified in these focus groups 
have been further validated in practitioners’ 
feedback sessions involving participants 
from these respective provinces that were 
subsequently held in Freetown, alongside 
representatives of FCC as well as in discussion 
sessions of the DDMC of FCC in 2020 and 2021. 
In its entirety, this has ensured a country-wide 
sample of local actors involving the provinces, 
multiple stakeholders and wide representation 
from over 100 interested parties.
Overall, 29 different SPOF were identified 
in the district focus groups and associated 
meetings as part of the data collection. 20 
SPOF (62%) were detected in two or more of 
the focus groups and were further validated in 
discussions in at least one of the subsequent 
practitioners’ feedback sessions and/or DDMC 
workshops in Freetown.
Three notable observations can be drawn from 
this data collection:
• There is a high degree of commonality of 
identified SPOF across the provinces.
• There is a notable degree of commonality 
of identified SPOF between the district and 
national levels.
• That the SPOF methodology was 
confirmed as a useful value-added tool 
and an insightful policy concept at the 
local level.
Notable SPOF
The data reveals numerous notable SPOF that 
can be grouped into a number of cross-cutting 
themes. It should be noted that while there 
have been improvements in the competence 
and capacity of Sierra Leone’s DM system over 
the period 2019-21, there remain numerous 
discernible SPOF in all of these cross-cutting 
areas. Thus the challenges remain substantial 
in all areas. The propensity for negative 
impacts within an area, in terms of severity, and 
for those impacts to have knock-on, scalable 
effects to other areas of the DM system and 
activities remains high. In short, there is still 
significant work to be done to address these 
SPOF. These cross-cutting thematic areas are 
outlined in Table 3.1 as follows:
3
“There is still 
significant work 





SPOF Identified as Severe Identified as Scalable
1. Data Management 75% 75%
2. Strategic Communication & 
Media Management 
75% 69%
3. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) 
& Early Warning Systems (EWS) 
69% 63%
4. Critical Infrastructure 38% 38%
5. Responder 75% 75%
6. Logistics 38% 38%
7. National/District Relations 88% 75%
8. Human Resources (& HR 
Expertise)
94% 94%
9. Procedural Issues 88% 88%
10. Lessons Learned 50% 50%
11. Coordination Challenges 69% 69%




Note: Percentage in second and third columns represents the proportion of the national interviews (N=16) only that 
identified the respective SPOF as having severe (within one area) and/or scalable (across areas of disaster
management) consequences and impacts. Indicative numbering of SPOF does not infer ranking.
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1. Data Management SPOF
Data Management constitutes a thematic area 
with discernible and high propensities for 
SPOF (see Table 3.2). This is important since 
data management and coordination remains a 
primary responsibility of the national disaster 
management unit of the central government 
(formerly the DMD in the ONS up until late 
2020 and now the recently established NDMA). 
In many ways, data management is an area 
where SPOF are commonly found since it 
reflects the harsh realities that successful 
data collection and management is a highly 
complicated task that requires substantial 
commitments in terms of human, technological 
and financial resources and often leads 
to tensions with other stakeholders, local 
communities and even the general public.
The research findings reveal that data 
management challenges are well recognised 
by the government and stakeholders (see 
World Bank, 2019). There have been major 
advances regarding the introduction of hard 
technological solutions like the use of mobile 
technologies (e.g. tablets and smart phones) to 
improve the ability to input data at the scene/
site. The research findings also suggest that 
there is growing use of dedicated software 
solutions to facilitate data input, collection and 
analysis to improve, for example, the ability 
to produce more accurate rapid response 
assessments. Nevertheless, there remain 
notable SPOF particularly in relation to the 

























1. Human Resource 
challenges regarding 
numbers of staff 
trained and available to 
complete registration of 
affected persons.
2. Actual collection of 
data for list of affected 
persons leading 
to inaccuracies or 
incomplete registration 
of affected persons.
3. Lack of clarity around 
procedures for revising 
data on affected 
persons after initial 
collection and data 
analysis.
4. Challenges in filtering 
out ineligible affected 
persons during data 
collection at scene 
leads to ‘swelling 
of numbers’ and 
inaccuracies in data.
75% 1. Disparities in awareness and training 
on new software platforms being used 
by NDMA among local actors, CDMCs 
and volunteers.
2. Local actors and NGOs are often 
concerned about inaccuracies, detail 
and specific data provided by NDMA 
assessment reports and registration 
lists of affected persons. 
3. Delays in production of NDMA 
assessment reports and list of affected 
persons lead to slow relief distribution 
by NGOs to local areas.
4. Significant concerns about a lack 
of clarity regarding responsibility and 
procedures for forwarding and handling 
local requests on revision of data for 
affected persons after initial collection 
and data analysis.
5. Lack of capacity of CDMCs, volunteers 
and responders produces constant 
challenges in filtering out ineligible 
affected persons during data collection 
at scene which often led to ‘swelling of 











digitilisation of data 
capture but there are 
often delays in getting 
specific profiles to 
stakeholders to facilitate 
follow-up action on 
relief and recovery.
44% 1. Improving digitilisation of data 
capture but there are often delays in 
getting specific profiles to stakeholders 
to facilitate follow-up action on relief 
and recovery.
Table 3.2: Data Management SPOF at the National and Local Levels.
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops)
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1. Improving usage of 
site mapping and data 
collection constrained 
by weak network and 
variations in IT support 
and systems.
2. Lack of self-
reporting and real time 
situational awareness 
systems to inform and 
contribute to ongoing 
situational awareness. 
44% 1. Improving usage of site mapping and 
data collection constrained by weak 
network and variations in IT support 
and systems at local and district levels. 
2. Lack of self-reporting and real time 
situational awareness systems to inform 
and contribute to ongoing situational 
awareness.
3. Good, but varied use of WhatsApp 
emergency groups by local NGOs, 
stakeholders and partners.
4. Lack of directories of councillors and 
CDMC chairs to be accessed at time of 
disaster response slows coordination 
and communication.
5. Lack of very high frequency (VHF) 
radios, directories and over-reliance on 
mobile phones among volunteers. 
Data Management SPOF at the National Level. 
75% of interview respondents, all focus groups 
and the vast majority (78%) of feedback and 
observed stakeholder meetings indicated that 
by far the most impactful SPOF existed in 
relation to three main issues relating to data 
management of the registration and listing of 
affected persons:
• Human Resource (HR) Limitations in the 
number of national officials (especially 
among NDMA staff) trained in data 
collection for Registration of Affected 
Persons lead to delays in completion of 
registration processes and to challenges 
when this limited number of trained 
national officials are required to handle 
simultaneous emergencies and disaster 
events. This can lead to delays of several 
days in the production of the required 
Registered List of Affected Persons (see 
Table 3.2);
• Procedural and Technical Limitations 
concerning the lack of clarity about access 
to, procedures on, and timeliness of, 
categorising data into respective sub-
groups required by wider stakeholders 
to aid the organisation of relief efforts. 
This often leads to later delays in the 
organisation and delivery of relief items 
such as food, water, clothing and school 
items. Stakeholders are often required to 
repeat requests to gain access or to secure 
essential data not always initially or 
readily released in the first instance;
27
3
• Procedural and Physical Challenges with 
the onsite collection of data used for 
the registration and development of the 
Official List of Affected Persons. There is 
constant pressure when dealing with on-
site demands from victims, representatives 
of CDMCs and councillors seeking to 
expand the registration list. In particular, 
further attention needs to be placed on 
addressing the weaknesses in multi-
agency cooperation and activities (e.g. 
cordoning) to deal with the challenge of 
filtering out ineligible persons at data 
collection points at the scene in order to 
reduce inaccuracies in the affected persons 
data collection. and to avoid ‘swelling of 
numbers’. It is often the case that persons 
from outside the actual scene of the 
disaster are attracted to the area in the 
hope of securing any potential economic 
and financial advantages that accrue with 
gaining registration on the official list of 
affected persons.
It is important to note that even with the 
improvements from wider training in the use 
of ODKs by the NDMA in 2021, the overall 
national picture is one of a still relatively 
immature and limited level of digitalisation. 
Data collection and capture as well as levels of 
analysis and dissemination, whilst dramatically 
improving, can also be regarded as a wider 
SPOF.
The limited digitalisation of information 
especially affects inter-ministerial and 
inter-agency cooperation during disaster 
response since the sharing of information and 
situational awareness across interoperable 
platforms is often constrained. It also impacts 
upon DRR efforts.
Some 44% of interviewed respondents also 
comment that a particular SPOF exists in that 
the absence of common agreements on the 
specific profiles for data capture often led to 
delays in accessing important and specific 
data profiles. This SPOF affected not just the 
facilitation of follow-up action on relief and 
response, but also affected and led to delays 
and miscommunications on transitions to 
recovery planning.
It was, for example, not always clear whether 
the government and stakeholders were 
transitioning in tandem from response to 
recovery modes. This indicates a lack of 
coordination, with some continuation (and 
duplication) of response efforts when other 
stakeholders were moving to recovery 
operations. In other words, the lack of access 
to common data profiles led to some agencies 
going it alone and being ‘out of step’ with 
government direction and coordination.
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In addition, the data findings highlighted 
that the impacts of this potential and real 
SPOF are also compounded by wider issues 
relating to weak and substantial variations in 
network and IT connectivity among national 
ministries, agencies and stakeholders. This 
includes variations in network and IT capacities 
even within a single government unit that 
constrains internal coordination and key data 
sharing. It also extends to variations across 
ministries.
Although there has been substantial 
investment in data systems and surveillance 
in the public health sphere, especially since 
the EVD outbreak of 2014-16 that resulted in 
the creation of the National Ebola Response 
Centre (NERC) and then the successor National 
COVID-19 Emergency Response Centre 
(NaCOVERC) and District COVID-19 Emergency 
Centre (DiCOVERC) arrangements to handle the 
response to COVID-19 since 2020, the same 
level of investment has not been available to 
other ministries or even the DMD in the ONS, 
which was responsible for coordinating other 
types of emergencies. This has weakened both 
data management and information sharing 
possibilities and led to some interoperability 
questions both across government and 
between government and other stakeholders. 
Around 44% of interviews highlighted that 
this has important implications in terms of 
potential SPOF including:
• Technical Limitations in Inter-Pillar 
Coordination. While there had been 
significant improvements in the availability 
of site mapping and Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS) solutions so 
that the mapping of impact sites at times 
of disasters is available to stakeholders 
and pillars, the weaknesses in connectivity 
and interoperability of IT systems meant 
that information sharing could be delayed 
when it comes to sharing the results. This 
had, for example, been noted by some 
stakeholders as a challenge in enabling 
more effective inter-pillar and stakeholder 
cooperation at the time of the Susan’s Bay 
Fire in March 2021.
• Physical and Resource Limitations in 
Situational Awareness. There were severe 
limitations in levels of self-reporting 
and in real time situational awareness 
with stakeholders and agents unable 
to effectively inform each other of their 
ongoing activities and contribute to up to 
date situational awareness. Despite the 
development of a robust pillar framework 
for disaster response by the NDMA that 
was implemented during the Susan’s Bay 
incident to good effect, the tendency was 
still to hold physical meetings and resist or 
not develop online platform participation 
as normal best practice because of the 
weakness in effective and interoperable 
IT systems and support. This continues to 
allow for SPOF in terms of a lack of self-
reporting, real time information and data 
sharing that inhibits the ability of national 
agencies to further coordinate activities to 
a very detailed level.
Data Management SPOF at the Local Level. 
Those specific SPOF at the national level 
clearly have implications and impacts on 
effective DM at the provincial, district and even 
ward levels. Many of these were confirmed in 
the respective research findings. In addition, 
several specific local-level SPOF were also 
highlighted including:
• Ineffective data collection. While local 
actors, CDMC and volunteers are often 
involved in the collection of data in 
support of the NDMA to complete 
registration of affected persons, there 
remain concerns about their effectiveness. 
Local actors suffered from significant 
variations in their awareness and capacity 
to input data into new applications being 










• Poor quality data. Local actors and NGOs 
were often not satisfied with the level of 
detail and specific data provided by NDMA 
assessment reports and registration lists of 
affected persons highlighting inaccuracies 
or incomplete registration of affected 
persons.
• Delays in the production of NDMA 
assessment reports and lists of affected 
persons lead to slow relief distribution by 
NGOs to local areas and scenes.
• Data Procedures. There were significant 
concerns about SPOF in relation to the 
lack of clarity about responsibility and 
procedures for forwarding and handling 
local requests towards revising data on 
affected persons after initial collection and 
data analysis.
• Lack of capacity of local CDMCs, volunteers 
and responders often produced constant 
challenges in filtering out ineligible 
affected persons during data collection 
points at the scene which often led to 
‘swelling of numbers’ and inaccuracies in 
data.
• Weak levels of digitalisation especially 
among local authorities and CDMCs mean 
they are highly reliant on expensive 
mobile phone access to GIS, hazard and 
site mapping and data analysis which 
restricts dissemination at local level.
• Lack of inexpensive and cheap self-reporting 
systems to inform and contribute to 
ongoing situational awareness among 
local actors.
• Few easily accessible directories of 
councillors and CDMC chairs to be 
accessed at time of disaster response 
slows coordination and communication.
• Lack of VHF radios, directories and over-




2. Strategic Communication and Media 
Management SPOF
There are significant SPOF identified in 
the data findings in relation to strategic 
communication and media management. It 
should be noted that notable progress has 
been made in terms of developing a coherent 
pillar structure to handle respective disasters 
including COVID-19 by the DMD and now 
NDMA. Progressive work continues to be done. 
That pillar structure, for example, envisaged 
and led to the creation of dedicated Risk 
Communication (RC), Social Mobilisation 
(SM) and Public Information (PI) pillars or 
combinations of these pillars to meet the 
requirements of the disaster response once 
set in motion. In each instance, prominent 
stakeholders with substantial expertise are 
recruited as joint leads with governmental 
figures and agencies to enhance levels of 
knowledge and co-ordination efforts. In 
addition, the development of the NERC and 
the creation of the NaCOVERC and DiCOVERC 
arrangements for handling COVID-19 have 
acted as useful testbeds for the development 
of improved strategic communication and 














1. Weak DDR focus within 
strategic communication.
2. Lack of pre-prepared key 
messaging and clarifications 
on common strategic 
communications messaging 
prior to onset of crisis. 
69%
75%
1. Significant delays in transfer 
and transmission of strategic 
communications from national to 
local levels.
2. Lack of local pre-prepared 
key messaging and clarifications 
on common strategic 
communications messaging prior 









69% 1. Little priority towards 
developing pre-prepared 
messaging among stakeholders 






1. Limited numbers of 
key government officials 
involved in or receiving 
media training or exercising.
2. Varied and often very 
limited engagement of 
disaster managers with 
differing forms of media 
including social media.
44% 1. Limited numbers of local 
community officials, councillors, 
CDMCs and volunteers involved 
in or receiving media training or 
exercising.
2. Varied and often very limited 
engagement of disaster managers 
with differing forms of media 
including social media.
Table 3.3: Media Management & Strategic Communication SPOF at the National & Local 
Levels. Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions 
and Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops)
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Strategic Communication and Media 
Management SPOF at the National Level. 
Nevertheless, the data suggests that there are 
still challenges that represent inherent SPOF 
which national agencies and stakeholders need 
to address (see Table 3.3). There is some way 
to go before they will be effectively removed. 
These relate to:
• Procedural Limitations: Weak Development of 
Coherent, Coordinated and Clear Messaging. 
Despite the creation of dedicated pillars 
at the time of emergencies, some 69% 
of respondents indicated that there is a 
notable SPOF relating to often a lack of, or 
at best a limited number of, pre-prepared 
messages that can be issued quickly 
at the time of any response. On many 
occasions, the pillars do not benefit from 
any kind of institutional memory or prior 
archive of suitable Sierra Leone-orientated 
messages that can be easily understood 
by the communities. There is also often an 
immediate challenge in providing speedy, 
accurate and preferably multi-lingual 
messaging that has been prepared and 
approved in Krio and other indigenous 
languages that can have timely utilisation 
in the various regions of Sierra Leone 
where English is not the first language.
• Human Resource Limitations: The 
Level of Media Knowledge and Trained 
Expertise in Media Management Available. 
Despite the pillar structures, there are 
severe limitations in the number of 
key government and agency officials 
that possess extensive media and/or 
crisis communication skills. Few have 
received recent and/or regular media 
training and exercising to make sure 
their skills in delivering effective crisis 
communication messaging are current and 
well refined. Some 44% of respondents 
and all the focus groups across the 
country highlighted the lack of dedicated 
and frequent media training and/or 
“Too little 
attention was 




exercising that lead to the potential 
for SPOFs in terms of media delivery, 
media messaging and miscommunication 
among key stakeholders and between key 
stakeholders and the public.
• Human Resource Limitations: Varied and 
very limited professionalized engagement 
with differing forms of media and social 
media platforms. At 44% this was a notable 
cited SPOF that highlighted a lack of 
familiarity with key media platforms used 
by stakeholders to liaise quickly. This even 
included, in some cases, WhatsApp, which 
is a widely utilized platform among DM 
policymakers and stakeholders in Africa. 
This lack of familiarity inhibited timely 
communication and coordination. It also 
highlighted an inherent caution and even 
resistance for key officials and stakeholders 
to understand, let alone engage with, 
social media platforms which are 
commonly frequented by the public and 
even key stakeholders as an essential form 
of crisis communication and information. 
These major challenges – that each represent 
notable potential SPOF – also intersect with 
observations in terms of issues with general 
strategic communication. A significant 75% 
of the interviews highlighted that these 
cumulative issues with media management 
led to a major SPOF in terms of strategic 
communication. More specifically,
• 69% of interviewees highlighted that 
too little attention was paid (if any) 
to prior messaging that could educate 
communities on DRR prior to disasters. A 
firm base of DRR strategic communication 
was not in place, although greater 
attention has been given more recently to 
addressing this problem.
• 75% of interviewees further confirmed 
that the main SPOF in terms of strategic 
communication related to the lack of 
prior prepared and approved messaging 
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and clarifications on common strategic 
communications messaging prior to 
the onset of a crisis. This leads to 
notable delays in the presentation 
of key background information and 
communicating key actions at the time of 
response while senior approvals for crisis 
messages were sought and contextualised.
Strategic Communication and Media 
Management SPOF at the Local Level. Those 
specific SPOF at the national level clearly 
have implications and impacts on effective 
DM at the provincial, district and even ward 
levels. Many of these were also confirmed in 
the respective research findings. In addition, 
several specific local-level SPOF were also 
highlighted including:
• Lack of pre-prepared messaging. Despite 
the successful use of WhatsApp groups 
as an easily accessible and inexpensive 
form of enhancing communication, local 
actors, including local authorities have 
often not engaged in developing pre-
prepared messaging prior to the onset 
of emergencies to take account of local 
languages and situations and also in 
relation to those hazards with the most 
relevance to their specific provinces, 
districts and communities.
• Media knowledge and training. Local 
community officials, councillors, CDMCs 
and volunteers often have not been 
involved in or have received dedicated 
media training or exercising in relation to 
disasters and emergencies.
• Media engagement. There are major 
variations and often limited engagement 
of disaster managers with differing forms 
of media including social media platforms 
and very little common guidance or codes 
of conduct on approaches to such usage.
• Strategic Communications. The significant 
delays in the timely transmission of 
strategic communications messaging 
from national to local levels often led 
to unapproved actions on the part of 
local actors or to delays in guidance and 
strategic communication being issued 
by local actors, thereby inhibiting the 














DRR 1. Limited DRR impetus 
leads to poorly attended 
meetings on DRR issues by 
stakeholders.
2. Unfocused DRR 
messaging particularly in 
educating communities prior 
to disasters. 
69% 1. Lack of updated hazard maps 
and up to date risk registers for 
most districts and wards.
2. Little DRR messaging received 
by local communities prior to 
disasters.
Early Warning EWS 1. Limited ability for EWS 
staff to quickly disseminate 
interpretations of data to 
key policy-makers.
2. Poor EWS-related 
communication to regions.
3. Lack of understanding 
among policy-makers of 
EWS terminology and 
interpretations.
4. Weak “battle-rhythm” 
and timings of important 
meetings lead to 
propensity for strategic 
miscommunication or lack 
of transmission of key 
messages to partners and 
stakeholders.
5. Lack of EWS investment, 
particularly maintenance 
budgets to service 
equipment and systems. This 
leads to breakdown and 
gaps in capacity.
69% 1. EWS messaging from ministries 
to districts is inconsistent and 
often delayed. Relies mostly 
on local individuals checking 
websites on their own.
2. Locals do not understand or are 
unable to interpret early warning 
data received from key policy-
makers.
3. Poor EWS related 
communication to regions.
4. Lack of understanding among 
local policy-makers, councillors, 
CDMCs and volunteers of EWS 
terminology and interpretations.
5. Weak “battle-rhythm” and 
timings of important meetings. 
Limited synchronisation between 
national and local levels leads 
to propensity for strategic 
miscommunication or lack of 
transmission of key messages to 
partners and stakeholders.
6. No local financing for EWS. 
Table 3.4: DRR & EWS SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops)
3. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) & Early Warning Systems (EWS) 
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DRR and EWS SPOF at the National Level. 
The document survey and interviews strongly 
highlighted the value of having effective 
and functioning EWS in Sierra Leone. The 
experience of ever more frequent floods as 
part of the annual rainy season and the impact 
of the 2017 landslide disaster were regularly 
cited as rationales for a stronger emphasis on 
functioning EWS capacities. Notable SPOF were 
also extensively recognised among participants 
in this study (see Table 3.4), namely 69% of the 
interviews highlighted:
• Lack of impetus limits DRR awareness. 
Until recently, the few totally dedicated 
meetings focusing entirely on DRR were 
often poorly attended by other ministries, 
departments and agencies restricting 
the ability to integrate and enhance DRR 
planning.
• EWS Human Resource Limitations. 
Limitations in expert staffing means that 
while investment in EWS was improving, 
there were still major challenges in 
terms of available human resources in 
Sierra Leone to interpret climatic and 
hydrological data being detected by 
EWS systems. The number of trained 
meteorologists and hydrologists in the 
country and available to the DM system is 
still rather small.
• EWS Human Resource Limitations in Wider 
Training. Alongside the issues with crisis 
communication, there had been very 
limited investment in improving the ability 
of EWS operatives to be able to quickly 
disseminate climatic and hydrological 
findings and interpretations picked up by 
EWS apparatus operating in Sierra Leone.
• EWS Human Resource Limitations at 
National and District Levels. More widely, 
at both national and district levels there 
was a lack of or very limited understanding 
among policymakers regarding key EWS 
terminology and data which inhibited their 
ability to conduct planning or preparations 
as well as to engage effectively with local 
communities.
• EWS Procedural Limitations. There was poor 
communication of EWS interpretations and 
communications to other stakeholders in 
a timely fashion and this was particularly 
the case in terms of poor and intermittent 
EWS-related communication to the 
provinces and districts outside Freetown. 
Information was often delayed and lacking 
in detail reducing the ability of regions 
and districts to prepare for the imminent 
arrival of bad weather and challenging 
climatic and meteorological conditions.
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• EWS Procedural Limitations. The scarcity 
and lack of detailed and easily accessible 
EWS information often contributed to 
weak “battle-rhythms” and timings of 
important meetings so that key EWS 
information did not feature or was not 
considered as part of strategic decision-
making and information sharing. This 
SPOF often led to propensities for strategic 
miscommunication or lack of transmission 
of related actions and decisions to key 
partners and stakeholders.
• EWS Financial Limitations. A major SPOF 
related to the lack of regular or insufficient 
size of maintenance budget to service and 
maintain complicated EWS equipment 
and systems (sensors, weather stations, 
weather balloons, IT software updates 
etc) that led to frequent breakdowns and 
gaps in capacity to undertake regular EWS 
functions. 
DRR and EWS SPOF at the Local Level. Those 
specific SPOF at the national level clearly 
have implications and impacts on effective 
DM at the provincial, district and even ward 
levels. Many of these were also confirmed in 
the respective research findings. In addition, 
several specific local-level SPOF (see Table 3.4) 
were also highlighted including:
DRR:
• There is a notable lack of updated and 
widely accessibly hazard maps and up to 
date risk registers for most districts and 
wards that take account of indigenous 
knowledge and viewpoints.
• Weak DRR messaging from local 
authorities particularly in educating 
communities prior to disasters.
• Considerable variations in cooperation of 
local chiefs and community leaders in DRR 
activities.
EWS:
• Messaging from ministries to districts is 
inconsistent and often delayed. EWS in 
practice relies mostly on local individuals 
checking websites on their own.
• Locals are not able to access, understand 
or easily interpret any early warning data 
analysis and interpretations from national 
policy-makers and ministries. This leads 
to missed opportunities to inform local 
disaster preparedness and response. 
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4. Critical Infrastructure SPOF
The field research also revealed common 
identification of a number of ongoing SPOF 
relating to critical infrastructure. While it is 
fair to say that given the country’s status as 
a less developed country (LDC), it is highly 











Quality of Road 
Network
1. While road networks have 
received more investment, 
there is a lack of coherent 
urban and strategic planning 
of road network.
2. Poor maintenance 
of road network and 
implementation of by-laws 
to protect and maintain 
them. Road network is often 
poorly maintained.
3. Weakness of supportive 
road structures like 
provision of fire hydrants 
and storm drainage to 
ensure 24/7 accessibility of 
road network for responders. 
38% 1. Weak urban planning and little 
rural investment on roads or road 
maintenance means remote and 
rural communities are poorly 
accessed or reachable in a timely 
manner.
2. Roads become impassable 
during rainy season due to lack of 
resilience.
3. Poor maintenance of road 
network and implementation of 
by-laws to protect and maintain 
them. Road network often poorly 
maintained.
4. Weakness of supportive road 
structures especially in informal 
settlements means that first 
responders are reliant on local 
volunteers and CDMCs (where 
active).
the country’s infrastructure are deficient or 
even lacking (e.g. comprehensive sanitation 
and clean water systems, waste disposal 
and sewage systems, power supply etc.), the 
interviewees and focus groups commonly 
identified a smaller number of critical 
infrastructural issues that define ongoing SPOF 
in terms of DM (see Table 3.5).
Table 3.5: Critical Infrastructure SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops)
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Critical Infrastructure SPOF at the National 
Level. Just over one third (38%) of the 
national interviews especially highlighted the 
SPOF for the DM system stemming from the 
inadequacies in the provision and maintenance 
of Sierra Leone’s national road network (see 
Table 3.5). While the policies and investments 
of successive governments have led to notable 
improvements in the country’s road networks, 
specific issues identified in the field research 
that are perceived to lead to strong likelihoods 
of SPOF for both the urban and rural areas 
include:
• Weak strategic planning. In terms of urban 
areas, weak implementation of coherent 
strategic planning of the road network 
means that many communities are not 
accessible by serviceable road networks 
that can be used by responders’ and 
stakeholders’ assets and vehicles. This can 
severely inhibit response for example to 
fire incidents in many of the major cities 
across Sierra Leone.
• Weak implementation of strategic planning 
of the road network restricts possibilities 
for cross-provincial support at times of 
common emergencies or to provide surge 
capacity (mainly from Freetown) in support 
of neighbouring provinces experiencing 
disasters.
• Poor or non-existent maintenance of the 
existing road network and weak and 
inconsistent enforcement of by-laws that 
undermine timely disaster response.
• Deficiencies in supportive structures that 
have relevance to emergency response 
(such as the limited number of fire 
hydrants in many parts of the urban 
areas) leads to limitations in the ability 
of responders to deal with incidents in a 
timely manner. 
• Inconsistent upkeep and lack of clearance of 
storm drains leads to flooding and drainage 
that can make some roads impassable 
or hard to use during times of disaster 
response.
• Poor road networks. In the rural areas, the 
weaknesses in road networks and bridges 
leads to accessibility issues and poor crisis 
communication with remote communities 









Critical Infrastructure SPOF at the Local 
Level. SPOF at the national level clearly 
have implications and impacts on effective 
DM at the provincial, district and even ward 
levels. Many of these were also confirmed in 
the respective research findings. In addition, 
several specific local-level SPOF were also 
highlighted. A distinctive feature of this data is 
that there was also a strong focus on utilities, 
especially electricity issues, in the local level 
discussions, including:
Roads:
• The weak enforcement of urban planning 
rules, laws and by-laws at the local 
level leads to unapproved buildings and 
structures being erected that block local 
roads especially in informal settlements.
• Local authorities and agencies provide 
little investment in rural roads or road 
maintenance leading to many remote and 
rural communities not being reachable in a 
timely manner. Rural CDMC arrangements 
therefore assume paramount importance.
• Lack of DRR key activities, such as 
clearance of storm drains, means roads 
become impassable during the rainy 
season and so lack resilience.
• There remains some confusion at the 
local level over responsibility for local 
reporting on and enforcement of by-laws, 
contributing to poor maintenance of local 
roads.
• Weakness of supportive road structures 
especially in informal settlements means 
that first response is over-reliant on local 
volunteers and CDMCs (where they are 
active).
Electricity:
• There were major concerns expressed 
about the lack of maintenance of local 
electricity supplies that are often obsolete 
which contribute to the outbreak of fires 
during the dry season.
• There were notable concerns about the 
lack of engagement of power companies 
with responders, local councillors 
and CDMCs in order to promote fire 




Table 3.6: Responder SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 









Responder Capacity of 
Responders
1. Road network does not 
ensure or cater for usage by 
responders.
2. Notable deficiencies in 
numbers and availability of 
operational equipment for 
NFF and SLP.
3. Lack of maintenance 
budgets for responders 
leads to breakdown and 
lack of availability of key 
equipment.
4. Limited and in many 
cases, no access to urban 
communities and informal 
settlements restricts 
responder involvement in 
disaster response.
5. Poor urban planning 
implementation and 
enforcement leads to 
inaccessible communities 
for responders.
6. Poor waste management 
implementation leads to 
lack of/limited access to 
sites and contamination 
of water sources for NFF 
response. 
75% 1. Road network does not ensure 
or cater for usage by responders.
2. Notable deficiencies in 
numbers and availability of 
operational equipment for NFF 
and SLP especially in provinces.
3. Notable variations of 
interpretations by responders 
as to their role and leadership 
functions in incident command.
4. Lack of maintenance budgets 
leads to breakdown and lack of 
availability of key equipment 
for responders especially in 
provinces.
5. Limited and in many cases, no 
access to urban communities, 
informal settlements and 
remote areas restricts responder 
involvement in disaster response.
6. Poor urban planning 
implementation and enforcement 
lead to inaccessible communities 
for responders.
7. Poor waste management 
implementation leads to lack 
of/limited access to sites and 
contamination of water sources 




Responder SPOF at the National Level. Not 
surprisingly given their vital importance to all 
phases of DM and especially disaster response, 
three-quarters of interviewees and all the 
focus groups and workshops identified SPOF 
in relation to key responders (NFF, SLP and 
RSLAF). It should be noted that in many cases, 
the commitment and professionalism of the 
responders in Sierra Leone was perceived 
positively. Nevertheless, the responders in 
Sierra Leone face many potential and real 
SPOF that affect all phases of DM (see Table 
3.6) and include:
• Weaknesses in the powers of responders 
to enforce laws and regulations that might 
enhance DRR and particularly response. 
For example, missing or inadequate fire 
safety legislation bestowing strong powers 
on the NFF to guide and enforce fire 
prevention and to enhance fire safety in 
communities.
• Notable deficiencies in numbers and 
availability of operational equipment for 
NFF and SLP. For example, operational fire 
plant, fire-fighting equipment, limitations 
in hazardous materials (HAZMAT) 
equipment, and police and fire vehicles. 
It should be noted that elements of this 
are improving (e.g. international funding 
in 2021 of some fire-fighting equipment 
for the NFF). However, notable gaps in 
equipment and provision for both NFF and 
SLP remain.
• Lack of maintenance budgets for responders 
to maintain and update equipment leads 
to the breakdown and lack of availability 
of key equipment for responders.
• Weaknesses in responder support structures, 
such as fire hydrants in urban areas, water 
tanks and foam supplies at fire stations.
• Poor urban planning implementation 
and enforcement lead to inaccessible 
communities for responders. In many 
cases, no access to urban communities and 
informal settlements prevents responder 
involvement in disaster response.
• Information-sharing. Responders often 
lack up to date local maps and access to 
risk registers for communities that can 
inform and improve their access to future 
incidents.
• Limited training opportunities for police and 
fire fighters to enhance their emergency 
response skills restrict skillsets of 
available responders, especially in relation 
to mass casualty incidents, chemical, 
biological or hazardous incidents.
Responder SPOF at Local Level. Those 
specific SPOF at the national level clearly 
have implications and impacts on effective 
DM at the provincial, district and even ward 
levels. Many of these were also confirmed in 
the respective research findings. In addition, 
several specific local-level SPOF were also 
highlighted including:
• Notable deficiencies in numbers and 
availability of operational equipment for NFF 
and SLP especially in the provinces mean 
that response is often restricted to some 
urban areas. Response times to rural areas 
are excessive or simply not undertaken by 
responders.
• Variations of interpretations by responders 
within and between the provinces as to 
their specific roles, contributions and 
leadership functions in incident command.
• Lack of local maintenance budgets for 
responders leads to breakdown and 
lack of availability of key equipment for 
responders especially in provinces
• Poor urban planning implementation and 
enforcement lead to responders being 
unable to access some communities.
• Weak local waste management 
implementation leads to lack of/limited 
access to sites and to contamination of 

















Logistics Logistics Store 
Management & 
Stockpiling
1. Despite improved 
warehouses and logistics 
management, limited 
stockpiles of key equipment 
exists at national 
government level.
2. Challenges of maintaining 
up to date inventories of 
available equipment at 
national and local levels.
3. Over reliance on donor 
logistical capacities that 
may quickly become 
overstretched and which 
may lead to donor-fatigue.
4. Duplication of roles 
among donors.
5. Resistance of NGOs to 
coordinate for reputational 
purposes.
38% 1. Lack of available stores or 
stockpiles in provinces and at 
local level countrywide. Poor 
stockpiling in communities.
2. Limited warehouses and 
logistics management, often few 
stockpiles of key equipment at 
local government level.
3. Challenges of maintaining up 
to date inventories of available 
equipment at local levels.
4. Over-reliance on donor 
logistical capacities that may 
quickly become overstretched 
and which may lead to donor 
fatigue.
5. Duplication of roles among 
donors. 
6. Resistance of NGOs to 
coordinate for reputational 
purposes. 
Table 3.7: Logistics SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops) 
6. Logistics SPOF
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3 Logistics SPOF at the National Level. In recent years, there has been a significant 
improvement in the logistical capacity at the 
national level for handling emergencies and 
disasters. Initiatives such as the inclusion of 
a seconded military officer with substantial 
logistics management experience in the (then) 
DMD and now NDMA has provided enhanced 
logistical planning and management. In 
addition, the actual capacity of Sierra Leone 
to stockpile key items as part of its mitigation 
strategy has been discernible, with new 
warehouse construction being completed often 
with funding and assistance from supporting 
international institutions and donors. 
Nevertheless, 38% per cent of the interviews, 
verified in all the feedback sessions, identified 
ongoing logistics as notable SPOF (see Table 
3.7). Five key observations in relation to SPOF 
were detected in the field research, including:
• Limited Stockpiles. Despite improved 
warehouses and logistics management, 
there remain very limited stockpiles of key 
equipment at national government level. 
Stockpiles are also strongly centralised 
around the Freetown area.
• Updated Inventories and Directories. 
There remain ongoing challenges of 
maintaining up to date inventories of 
available equipment at national and local 
levels. This is compounded by a lack of 
shared inventories with NGOs to ensure 
coordination of purchasing and prevent 
misappropriation of funding.
• Over-reliance on donor logistical capacities 
that may quickly become overstretched, 
prompting new and even ongoing ‘donor-
fatigue’. Indeed, the heavy reliance on 
donor capacities tends to accentuate the 
focus on disaster response among national 
DM policies since there is a larger number 
of NGOs engaged in relief operations 
and activities. It also leads to stronger 
propensities for duplication of roles and 
outcomes among donors and NGOs so that 
some resources are not distributed evenly 
across affected communities and areas.
• Duplication of roles among donors. There 
is a strong tendency for donor NGOs 
to increasingly undertake their own 
risk assessments and follow their own 
prioritization, leading to an increased 
likelihood of duplication of efforts, a focus 
on relief items that donors, rather than the 
coordinator agencies, want to prioritise 
and tensions with the NDMA who seek to 
maintain oversight of the disaster response 
and relief processes.
• Resistance of NGOs to coordinate for 
reputational purposes. There is a notable 
trend that NGOs are often attracted to 
intervention in high profile disasters 
where media attention is large and NGO 
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3stockpiles and logistic management structures to handle even Level 1 incidents. 
Lack of warehouses and stockpiles in many 
provinces leads to management and time 
pressures to supply from Freetown over 
long distances.
• Lack of planning and situational awareness. 
Due to the lack of local risk registers and 
local emergency plans available to CDMCs 
and volunteers, there is an accompanying 
lack of planning and situational awareness 
of how future requests for supplies and 
stockpiles will be addressed.
• Logistics Management. There are significant 
SPOF in terms of the challenges of 
maintaining up to date inventories of 
available equipment at local levels. Local 
requests to government are therefore slow 
and often incoherent, leading to delays 
with governmental distributions and 
actions.
• Over-reliance on donor logistical capacities. 
Even at Level 1 disasters, there is a 
complete overreliance on donor logistical 
capacities in terms of transport and 
supply vehicles that may quickly become 
overstretched. This accentuates ‘donor-
fatigue’, duplication of NGOs roles and 
resistance among NGOs to coordinate for 
reputational purposes.
profiles’ can be extended and furthered. 
This led to numerous instances in 2021 
including, for example, the oversupply of 
relief items to Susan’s Bay rather than a 
wider concentration on other incidents 
and affected areas in Freetown. It also 
led to notable differences in perception 
and NGOs ignoring statements by NDMA 
that the respective response phasing had 
finished and all actors were to transition 
to supporting recovery operations in May 
2021.
Logistics SPOF at the Local Level. Those 
specific SPOF at the national level have 
implications for effective DM at the provincial, 
district and even ward levels. Many of these 
were also confirmed in the respective research 
findings. Several specific local-level SPOF were 
also highlighted including:
• Warehouse and storage limitations. There 
are notable SPOF in the availability of 
secure warehousing and storage units 
in many of the informal settlements 
of the country’s cities given levels of 
poverty. Hence, there are few if any major 
stockpiles, leading to immediate shortages 
of key supplies, equipment and tools when 
emergencies occur. 
• Limited provincial stockpiling capacities. 
Most provinces lack sufficient logistical 
“There are few 




Table 3.8: National – District Relations SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops)














1. Haphazard and slow 
transmission of instructions 
and key communications 
from central government 
with notable time lags in 
terms of implementation in 
districts.
2. Weak and ad hoc 
coordination with districts 
in terms of coordinating 
response with local 
councillors, CDMCs and 
volunteers leading to 
duplication of effort.
3. Focus entirely on 
response. Limited DRR 
awareness.
75% 1. Major concerns amongst local 
actors about misunderstanding of 
key communications from central 
government with notable time 
lags in terms of implementation 
in districts.
2. Districts often unclear as 
to level of local responsibility 
for areas of coordinating 
response, including among 
local councillors, CDMCs and 
volunteers leading to duplication 
of effort.
3. Local districts largely focused 
entirely on response. Limited DRR 
awareness means local actors 
only consider DRR activities at 




Resourcing 1. Reliance upon 
development of specific 
‘stand-alone’ local requests 
and budgets that leads 
to delays in government 
decisions and funding.
2. Heavy reliance on donors 
to provide coordination and 
delivery at the local levels.
3. Few (if any) training or 
exercising budgets to allow 
for updating and testing of 
response plans.
50% 1. Districts often lack dedicated 
financial resources from local 
authorities to coordinate efforts 
at the local level.
2. Little guidance from 
government to local actors 
on how to write specific local 
requests and budgets can lead to 
poor applications and then delays 
in government decisions/funding.
3. Almost complete reliance on 
donors to provide coordination 
and delivery at the local levels.
4. Few (if any) training or 
exercising budgets to allow for 



















1. Capacity Issues: NDMA 
and national agencies 
often unclear as to number 
of active volunteers in 
operation.
2. Liaison Issues: Challenges 
with updated lists of CDMC 
leaderships and contact 
addresses of key persons in 
districts.
3. NDMA- district 
cooperation limited by 
weaknesses of DM delivery 
units in local authorities. 
NDMA often called to 
deliver Level 1 functions 
especially outside Freetown
88% 1. Resilience and lack of accurate 
lists of CDMC members and 
active volunteers.
2. Local actors concerned about 
reliability of local volunteers at 
times of crisis.
3. Supporting logistics often weak 
and not planned; are ad hoc at 
times of disaster response.
4. Limited training of volunteers.
5. Sometimes strained relations 
with traditional authorities/local 
rulers/chiefs.
National – District Relations SPOF at the 
National Level. From the perspective of 
central government and national stakeholders, 
relations with the districts were identified as a 
notable area for SPOF (see Table 3.8). Indeed, 
this area was identified strongly among the 
interviewees with 75% identifying relations 
with the districts as a notable area for SPOF, 
as well as featuring strongly in all feedback 
seminars and workshops. An even more 
notable 88% highlighted issues relating to the 
robustness of active community resilience in 
terms of capacity and liaison issues (see Table 
3.8). For the most part, perceived areas of SPOF 
in relation to the districts tended to focus on 
the following aspects:
• Limited DRR awareness among provinces 
and districts. Despite national efforts to 
promote a stronger focus on DRR in recent 
years, the local districts in all provinces 
of Sierra Leone remained largely focused 
on response and showed limited DRR 
awareness. This may, of course, be partly 
because most districts rely heavily on 
volunteers at times of emergencies, which 
leads to limited opportunities to engage in 
DRR activities.
• Crisis Communication delays and deficiencies 
between national and district levels. 
Although there has been a stronger focus 
at the national level on enhancing crisis 
communication and interactions with the 
local districts, there remain many instances 
of haphazard and often slow transmission 
of data, instructions, key guidance 
and communications from central 
government and national stakeholders 
to the district level that tended to lead 
to or accentuate time lags in terms of 
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further implementation and action in 
the provinces and districts. It is the case 
that guidance for 72 hours (as a target 
deadline) for the delivery of effective 
disaster response to communities was 
often missed, sometimes by a wide margin 
of days or even weeks.
• Limited national documentation and 
guidance from the national level on the roles 
of local chiefs, policymakers, stakeholders and 
volunteers at times of disaster. In general, 
there remains a propensity for weak and 
ad hoc coordination with districts leading 
to some confusion and even duplication 
of effort. This pertains particularly to 
disaster response where chaotic, sporadic 
and ad hoc coordination with districts 
often reinforces notable variations in the 
maturity and extent of coordination among 
local councillors, CDMCs and volunteers. 
The focus groups and workshops also 
confirmed a prevailing perception that 
the role of local chiefs and tribal leaders 
as influencers on community perceptions 
towards DM was often underestimated at 
the national level.
• Community Resilience, Volunteer Capacity 
Issues. NDMA and national agencies 
are often unclear as to the number of 
active volunteers in operation within 
respective local areas, which complicates 
assumptions for DRR and response 
planning. In particular, wider local 
authority and NDMA logistical support as 
well as discussions on future stockpiling 
requirements remain complicated by the 
uncertainties around active volunteer 
capacities.
• CDMC Liaison Issues: Challenges with 
updated lists of CDMC leaderships and 
contact addresses of key persons in districts. 
National agencies are often delayed by 
the need to pursue updates on contacts 
at times of response. These CDMC liaison 
issues also have local implications 
since the lack of updated lists of CDMC 
leaderships and active volunteers also 
meant that councillors and community 
leaders were not always clear as to who 
they could rely on or indeed contact at 
times of disaster response.
• Weaknesses of Local Delivery Units. 
NDMA/district cooperation is limited by 
weaknesses of existing, or indeed often 
the complete lack of, DM delivery units in 
local authorities. NDMA is often called to 
deliver Level 1 functions especially outside 
Freetown.
National – District Relations SPOF at the Local 
Level. A cluster of SPOF were also identified 
in the interviews relating to the weaknesses 
in the resourcing of DM at the local level that 
in turn compounded pressures at the national 
level (see Table 3.8). More specifically, half of 
all interviewees identified in relation to:
• Lack of dedicated financial resourcing for 
DM at the district level. Districts often 
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lack dedicated financial resources and 
targeted contingency budgets from local 
authorities to coordinate DM efforts at 
the local level. This is an important SPOF 
since national structures envisage that 
the local authorities and stakeholders will 
lead for Level 1 emergencies and be in 
support of national efforts for Level 2 and 
3 emergencies. Presently there seems to be 
little or only remedial financial planning 
and support for local districts actions even 
under Level 1 emergencies.
• There is an overreliance on the development 
of ad hoc and/or specific ‘stand-alone’ local 
requests and budgeting during the onset 
of a crisis or emergency that leads to a 
delay in disaster response due to the need 
for related government decisions, funding 
and action. This also places considerable 
pressures on local councillors and CDMCs 
during disaster response to coordinate 
local requests and demands.
• Lack of additionality. Heavy dependency 
on donors to provide coordination and 
delivery at the local levels tends to act 
as a replacement for the lack of district 
provision rather than providing integrated 
additional support to ongoing local 
actions. Local actors look strongly to 
favoured NGOs, like the Sierra Leone Red 
Cross (SLRC), rather than local authorities 
or national organisations, for support in 
the first instance. This is compounded by 
weaknesses in the availability and capacity 
of local responders, such as the local NFF, 
to provide fire prevention and/or fire-
fighting training to local communities.
• Lack of resourcing for the production of and/
or the updating of risk registers, plans and/
or standard operating procedures (SOPs). 
In many provinces, updated DRR or 
response plans, risk registers and/or SOPs 
are not in existence. In the few districts 
and provinces where some do exist, they 
are not widely accessible to key actors, 
stakeholders and nor are they updated on 
a regular basis.
• Few (if any) training or exercising budgets 
to allow for updating and testing of risk 
registers, emergency response plans and/
or SOPs.
• Very limited financial provision to meet 
demands of councillors and CDMCs for 
specific training to improve the skillsets 
of volunteers, such as flood prevention 
knowledge, first aid or socio-psychological 
counselling for victims. There is an 
acknowledged shortage of volunteers at 
the local level with important skillsets 
to enhance local capacity for DRR and 
disaster response.
A further series of specific SPOF that were 
perceived by local actors as undermining active 
and robust community resilience are outlined 
in Table 3.8. Key observations are incorporated 
above given the strong synergies across the 
observations.
“There seems 








Table 3.9: Human Resources SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops)













1. DMD/NDMA have limited 
(although now improving) 
numbers of employed staff to 
cover all regions/role.
2. Small (although expanding)
size of senior leadership team 
of DMD (ONS)/NDMA.
3. Few staff with specialist DM 
qualifications in DMD/NDMA.
4. Finite ability of DMD/NDMA 
to handle simultaneous or 
cascading emergencies.
5. Huge pressures on DMD/
NDMA staffing during 
registration of affected persons.
6. Limited specific DRR 
expertise of DMD/NDMA staff.
94% 1. Local authorities lack or 
have very limited numbers 
of employed staff with DM 
experience and rely extensively 
on volunteers.
2. Limited size of senior 
leadership team of local 
authorities.
3. Limited number of staff with 
specialist DM qualifications and 
expertise employed at local 
level.
4. Very limited ability of local 
actors to handle simultaneous 
or cascading emergencies.
HR Expertise Training and 
Exercising
1. Variations in training and 
exercising expertise among 
DMD/NDMA staff.
2. Restricted NDMA led training 
and exercising opportunities at 
district and community levels.
3. Limited DRR expertise and 
training of DDMC and CDMC 
levels led by NDMA. 
81% 1. Variations in training and 
exercising expertise among 
local actors.
2. Few specific training/ 
exercising opportunities at 
district and community levels.
3 Weak focus of any training on 
DRR at DDMC and CDMC levels.
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Human Resources SPOF at the National 
Level. An overwhelming 94% of interviewees, 
alongside participants in all feedback sessions 
and workshops emphasised that notable SPOF 
existed in relation to the human resourcing 
of key DM functions and institutions within 
Sierra Leone (see Table 3.9). The respective 
feedback focused not so much on the failings 
of human resources (in terms of human error 
or misjudgements) but rather focused on 
the finite size and capacity of the human 
resources available that made Sierra Leone’s 
national cohort of disaster managers a small 
and exhaustible cohort of experts. This 
cohort can easily be overstretched when 
faced with complicated emergency situations, 
simultaneous multiple hazard events and/
or separate emergencies happening at the 
same time in different parts of the country. 
Moreover, the SPOF which existed during the 
time of the DMD as a small department of the 
ONS continue – even in 2021 – given the fact 
that the successor NDMA currently maintains 
a relatively small, although expanding, staff 
complement.
More specifically, the findings of the research 
point to identified SPOF in relation to:
• DMD (ONS) and now NDMA have finite 
numbers of employed staff that are required 
to cover all regions and roles, multiple 
types of hazards and increasingly to 
coordinate all phases of the DM cycle 
including coordinating DRR, preparedness, 
response and even contributing to recovery 
mandates.
• Staff Capacity. Whilst there have been 
significant improvements in attention 
to and investment in planning and new 
technologies to reduce pressures on 
staff, the obligations and duties on this 
small complement are often significant, 
staff-intensive and growing in scale and 
complexity. This is compounded by the 
present concerns among some NDMA staff 
relating to job security as the new agency 
establishes itself over time.
• Intensive duties are placed on the small 
cohort of NDMA staff including staffing 
and providing initial site and scene 
assessments of disasters and the 
completion of registration and Registered 
Lists of Affected Persons that can take up 
significant amounts of critical staff time 
during the early stages of a disaster.
• The senior leadership team of both the 
DMD (ONS) and NDMA is comparatively 
small. Whilst that leadership team 
contains substantial DM experience 
and is expanding, there remain notable 
constraints on the leadership's ability 
to steer coordination of a complex array 




• Among the limited number of staff employed, 
there are significant constraints on the 
development of their respective skillsets. 
While all share some basic DM training, 
there is often a lack of advanced level 
training and education with only a small 
minority of staff having attained specialist 
DM qualifications, and/or university 
level degrees in disaster management. 
There remain not just quantitative, but 
also qualitative, limitations on levels of 
dedicated DM expertise found within the 
ranks of the DMD and now NDMA.
• DRR Expertise. Regardless of Sierra Leone’s 
commitments to international frameworks, 
such as the Sendai UN Framework for DRR, 
existing expertise in DRR techniques is 
currently limited with few opportunities 
to pursue further DRR knowledge and 
training among DMD (ONS) and now 
NDMA staff.
In practice, these quantitative and qualitative 
limitations culminate in the limited ability 
of DMD (ONS) and now NDMA to handle 
simultaneous or cascading emergencies/
disasters. For example, there are huge 
pressures on the limited number of formerly 
DMD and now NDMA staff to deliver accurate 
registration of affected persons during the 
onset of simultaneous emergency situations.
There are also qualitative SPOF in terms of 
levels of available HR expertise. A sizeable 
81% of interviewees, alongside participants 
in all feedback sessions, emphasised that 
notable SPOF were further accentuated by 
limitations to pursue career development, 
career progression, education and training in 
disaster management. Further specific SPOF 
were highlighted in terms of:
• Lack of formal recruitment procedures, 
competence frameworks and career 
development strategies for disaster 
managers at the national and local levels.
• Limited opportunities to pursue specialised 
and/or comprehensive training at both 
basic and advanced levels due to the lack 
of dedicated training budgets to finance 
the career development of DMD and now 
NDMA staff.
• Variations in the training and especially 
direct exercising experience among DMD 
(ONS) and NDMA staff. While it is correct 
that most DMD (ONS) and now NDMA 
staff will have experienced DM exercising 
activities per se, levels of participation in 
covering differing types of hazards varies 
considerably, and in some cases, there are 
significant intervals before staff participate 
in respective exercises. This means that the 
NDMA lacks significant numbers of staff 
updated and exercised in all areas of DM 
with, in many instances, recent experience 
of exercise participation leading to a heavy 
reliance on an even smaller number of 
DM individuals to lead and contribute to 










Human Resources SPOF at the Local Level.
Existing DM capacity at the local level is not 
extensive. There continue to be only a very 
small number of local employed officials 
trained or educated to advanced levels in 
disaster management. Many districts lack 
access to local DM experts even among DDMC 
and CDMCs. In general, this restricts interactive 
engagement between national and local 
policymakers and officials.
There are also a notable cluster of SPOF 
identified at the local level in terms of training 
and exercising to reinforce levels of HR 
expertise that underscore national viewpoints. 
These include:
• Recognition that few training and 
exercising opportunities exist at district 
and community DM levels across the 
country, especially in the provinces. This 
further constrains interactive engagement 
between national and local officials and in 
the delivery of joint training and exercising 
around key hazards.
• Budget Constraints. Due to the lack of local 
training budgets, all local training and 
exercise activity has to be provided by 
external NGOs and they largely determine 
the nature of local training. Where they 
exist, they often focus on addressing basic 
operational considerations in terms of First 
Aid training and fire-fighting rather than 
DM planning techniques and knowledge
• Limited DRR expertise and training of DDMC 
and CDMC levels. This tends to be largely 
response-focused, if it takes place or exists 
at all.
• Lack of joint training. While some aspects 
of DM training and education have 
improved considerably in the metropolitan 
Freetown area due to the commitment of 
FCC to develop Level 1 competences and 
awareness among local disaster managers, 
this has not yet translated into a holistic 
and comprehensive joint training of 
national and local disaster managers and 
stakeholders.
• There remain deficiencies in DRR expertise 
and training at DDMC and CDMC levels. 
Where there are efforts to improve local 
disaster management, the focus largely 
remains on response, with a strong 
tendency to concentrate on galvanising 
councillors, local volunteers and CDMCs 
into action. Exercising on the recognition 
of differences in and implementation 
of Level 1, 2 and 3 disasters and 
understanding thresholds for NDMA 
intervention and actions is notably lacking 
at the moment, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of future SPOF occurring. 
52
3
Table 3.10: Procedural Issues SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops)


















1. Lack of up-to-date risk 
matrices and risk registers 
at national and local levels. 
Where they exist, they are 
often not widely accessible 
to disaster managers.
2. Lack of up-to-date DRR 
and response plans that 
are not widely accessible 
to disaster managers. Also 
many areas without SOPs.
3. Lack of clarity among 
disaster managers on 
thresholds for interventions.
4. Lack of training and 
exercising of DRR and/
or response plans. Often 
irregular where they exist 
and under-funded.
5. Over-reliance upon 
external financial support 
and donors for financing of 
training and exercising. 
88% 1. Lack of up-to-date risk matrices 
and risk registers covering local 
and particularly ward level. 
Where they exist, they are often 
not widely accessible to disaster 
managers, CDMCs and volunteers.
2. Lack of up-to-date local DRR 
and response plans and SOPs that 
are widely accessible to disaster 
managers.
3. Lack of clarity among disaster 
managers on thresholds for 
interventions. Few linked 'all 
hazards' arrangements that view 
local hazards together. 
4. Lack of training and exercising 
of DRR and/or response plans. 
Often irregular where they exist 
and under-funded.
5. Over-reliance upon external 
financial support and donors 




Too Focused on 
Response
1. Focus only on response 
despite NDMA remit to 
include DRR and recovery 
functions.
2. Lack of clarity on criteria 
for transition out of 
response
38% 1. Local arrangements focus 
almost entirely on response, eg 
first aid (if at all) and distribution 
of relief.
2. Little practical focus on DRR 
and recovery functions. Lack of 









Procedural Issues SPOF at the National 
Level. A remarkably consistent finding 
from the interviews and feedback sessions 
with practitioners at the national level is 
the ongoing concern about the lack of a 
comprehensive suite of contemporary and 
updated procedures, policies, guidance, 
plans and SOPs. A striking 88% of interview 
respondents, accompanied by regular 
commentary and consistent feedback in the 
practitioners’ session, confirmed the absence 
of a strong culture of updated documentation 
and planning even at the national level of 
DM in Sierra Leone. While this is significantly 
improving due to the efforts of the new 
NDMA, supported by sizeable investment 
strategies and funding from the World Bank, 
they are working from an essentially ‘late 
start’ position. While 2021 should see the 
drafting and the introduction of, for example, 
a raft of new DRR and preparedness plans and 
documentation at the national level, there 
remain significant SPOF in this area given that 
the implementation of any plans in 2021 will 
take more time to address. There will remain 
an asymmetry between the realities of Sierra 
Leone’s DRR on the ground and the obligations 
of meeting UN SDGs and Sendai resilience for 
some time to come. Identified SPOFs include:
• Weaknesses in the provision, accessibility and 
distribution of DM documents. This includes 
relatively poor attention to creating 
contemporary and regularly reviewed and 
updated risk matrices and risk registers at 
both national and local levels.
• SOP Weaknesses. While the NDMA is 
making considerable efforts to begin to 
modernize and update the existing range 
of key national DM plans and frameworks 
in line with its powers under the 2020 
legislation, there remain notable gaps and 
weaknesses at the level of accompanying 
SOPs. Where they exist, mainly around the 
disaster response function, they are only 
presently in draft form and have not been 
widely enacted. They can also be vague 
and poorly written with, for example, 
widespread concern among DMD and 
NDMA staff about the need for stronger 
demarcations and thresholds around Level 
1, 2 and 3 emergencies criteria that act 
as the barometer for differing types and 
levels of NDMA intervention, coordination 
and leadership. It is often the case that 
plans are not shared adequately with key 
stakeholders, so that they are not widely 
accessible to disaster managers before or 
even during an emergency.
• There has been a long-standing lack 
of attention to DRR issues and limited 
provision of and commitment towards 
comprehensive and up-to-date DRR and 
even response plans. While the NDMA, with 
World Bank funding, has begun to address 
this, the lack of a supportive DRR culture, 
including update and review, will mean 
that SPOF around the implementation 
of DRR planning will remain for the 
foreseeable future.
• Lack of clarity in 2021 on levels of disasters 
among disaster managers and thresholds for 
interventions. Even when this is addressed, 
SPOF exist around likely potential 
uneven implementation and diversity in 
interpretation among stakeholders.
• Limited opportunities for training and 
exercising of DRR and/or response plans. 
Often irregular and under-funded where 
such opportunities do exist.
• Over-reliance upon external support 
and donors for financing of training and 
exercising. For the most part they rely upon 
NGOs initiatives, provision and funding 
which tends to lead to insular rather than 
systematic planning of exercising. Often 
the provision and type of exercising is 
defined by the perspectives and agendas of 
the donors rather than by the detailed and 




“There is a 
notable lack of 




The striking consensus and findings regarding 
procedural and planning issues sheds light 
on and reinforces a secondary finding from 
the field research at the national level. This is 
that despite a more focused and modernised 
remit being provided by 2020 legislation in 
relation to the establishment of the NDMA 
(especially in relation to DRR and recovery 
functions) the SPOF around weak, immature 
or poorly updated and reviewed planning and 
procedures imply that there is still a prevailing 
lack of clarity and criteria governing NDMA 
guidance on the transition out of response 
and into recovery modes (raised by 38% of 
interviewees and in 66% of the practitioners’ 
feedback sessions). This SPOF was also 
illustrated in practice in the case of the 
Susan’s Bay Fire incident in March 2021 when 
discussions about the ending of the response 
phase being put forward by the NDMA were 
complicated by a lack of clarity and the need 
to discuss the process for considering the 
recovery options for the future of Susan’s 
Bay. Limitations in procedures governing 
transitions between response and recovery led 
to significant delays from April to July 2021 
regarding the future direction of the recovery 
process.
Procedural Issues SPOF at the Local Level: 
• There is a notable lack of or very limited 
access to updated risk matrices and 
risk registers at local levels so that 
nuances in hazards and threats and 
the interdependencies and shared 
vulnerabilities between specific wards and 
districts are not given sufficient attention. 
Where they are in existence, local risk 
registers are often not widely accessible to, 
or updated regularly by, local councillors, 
CDMCs and volunteers.
• There are few regularly up-to-date DRR and/
or local emergency response plans. Again, 
where these exist, they are often not 
widely accessible to disaster managers 
and/or used as a basis for local exercising. 
This leads to local tensions between 
councillors and CDMC leaderships as to 
responsibilities for local actions in relation 
to DRR and disaster response.
• Lack of clarity on levels of disasters among 
disaster managers and thresholds for 
interventions by respective bodies. Not 
normally declared by local actors leading 
to confusions as to which organization(s) 
is/are responsible for lead in interventions.
• Lack of training and exercising of DRR and/
or response plans. Often irregular where 
they exist and under-funded, which means 
that local CDMCs are often ill-informed of 
national guidance and initiatives.
• Local scheduling and delivery are almost 
solely reliant on external funding and 
capture. Donors fund limited training 
projects in selective communities rather 
than holistic training opportunities across 
local areas.
Furthermore, the culture of focusing largely 
on response leads to two specific SPOF at the 
local level namely:
• Local CDMC arrangements have 
traditionally focused almost entirely on 
operational aspects of response, such 
as first aid and the distribution of relief 
supplies.
• Little practical focus on recovery functions. 
Councillors and CDMCs often suffer from 
a lack of clarity on criteria for transition 
out of response and which national bodies 
they are to engage with. 
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Table 3.11: Lessons Learned SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops) 











1. Weak focus (although 
improving) on After Action 
Reviews (AARs) and formal 
mechanisms for capturing 
lessons identified from 
emergencies.
2. Lack of systemic 
mechanisms and procedures 
in place to implement 
lessons learned leading to 
repetitive issues and SPOF 
during onset of disasters. 
50% 1. Limited engagement of local 
actors in After Action Reviews 
(AARs) and formal mechanisms 
for capturing lessons identified 
from emergencies.
2. Poor access to GIS results and 
systems that can inform local 
disaster planning.
3. CDMCs often lack guidance, 
incentives and procedures on how 
to implement lessons learned 
leading to repetitive SPOF during 
onset of disasters. 
Lessons Learned SPOF at the National Level.  
Building on the prior findings in relation to 
SPOF associated with missing or deficient 
documentation, it is also notable that 50% 
of interview respondents and feedback at all 
levels (100%) of the practitioners’ sessions also 
highlighted SPOF in relation to the identifying 
and learning of lessons from the experience of 
disasters (see Table 3.11). Most notably:
• Limited systematic mechanisms and 
procedures in place to implement Lessons 
Identified leading to repetitive failures 
to implement lessons in time for future 
disaster events. The NDMA continues to 
significantly improve procedures including 
the production of well-structured AARs 
to formally capture lessons identified 
from disaster events (see Thornhill and 
Rogers, 2021). Observations registered 
from stakeholders as part of the ongoing 
evaluation work of AFRICAB revealed 
that the NDMA’s published AAR on the 
Susan’s Bay incident in April-May 2021 for 
example was generally well-received and 
perceived as well crafted. However, two 
further SPOF were consistently identified 
at key practitioner meetings.
• Weaknesses in the usage of virtual 
technologies and platforms like Skype, 
Zoom or Microsoft Teams at important 
AAR consultation meetings leads to 
key stakeholders not being able to 
attend the very limited number of AAR 
related meetings. This led to perceptions 
among key stakeholders around limited 
consultations and a lack of accessibility to 
input into AAR processes.
• Follow-up of AARs are not robust. Lessons 
identified are not routinely being 
translated into Lessons Learned and 
then implemented. Stakeholders remain 
unclear as to how AARs are formally taken 
56
3
forward procedurally to affect future 
implementation. This leads to concerns 
that AARs are seen as the end of the 
processes and procedures of review rather 
than as valuable input into enhanced 
continuous review. As a case in point, the 
consistent demands among stakeholders 
to have wider virtual access to key 
NDMA meetings on the implementation 
of Lessons Learned has so far been not 
uniformly or consistently applied.
Lessons Learned SPOF at the Local Level. The 
national oriented SPOF in relation to weak 
implementation of Lessons Learned is often 
compounded at the local level. Three specific 
SPOF were cited extensively during the focus 
groups and practitioner workshops namely:
• Inconsistent access to GIS results and 
systems prevents important insights 
and data that can inform local disaster 
planning from filtering down to local 
councillors and CDMCs in a way that could 
enhance DRR and disaster preparedness.
• Limited engagement of local actors in After 
Action Reviews (AARs). Lessons identified 
in AARs are often based on quickly 
called meetings that lead to poor local 
involvement and limited capture of local 
lessons. Often key local actors, like chiefs, 
are not informed of AAR meetings and 
CDMC and volunteer representation are 
often poor at AAR/recovery meetings.
• Lack of systemic guidance and procedures 
and incentives from NDMA mean that many 
CDMCs and volunteers are unclear on how 
to implement Lessons Identified which 
inevitably leads to the repetition of SPOF 
during future disasters. 
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Table 3.12: Coordination Challenges SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops) 














1. Ministries often view DMD/
NDMA as a replacement rather 
than a coordination body during 
emergencies.
2. Lack of permanent capacity 
within ministries. The practice 
of establishing official DM 
contact points in ministries is 
not well developed.
3. Lack of training and 
exercising within ministries 
on handling disaster related 
functions.
4. Lack of implementation of 
lessons identified by ministries 
even when AAR or reviews are 
undertaken by DMD/NDMA. 
69% 1. Weak DRR activities of 
ministries means they are 
not properly engaged with 
councillors and CDMCs in 
promoting DRR in communities. 
2. Confusing role in disaster 
response; multiple levels of 
representation from differing 
ministries visiting disaster 
scenes provokes confusion 
among CDMCs and volunteers 
on chains of command.
3. Contact points for liaison and 
guidance in ministries are often 
unclear to local actors. Local 





of NGO Aid/ 
Private Sector
1. Heavy reliance on donor 
NGOs to implement pillar 
operations during disasters.
2. High propensity for 
siloed operations and weak 
communication between 
donors/NGOs and DMD/NDMA.
3. Weak inter-pillar coordination 
at meetings, focusing on 
reporting back activity rather 
than coordinating future 
activities.
4. At Level 1 disasters local 
authorities often lack any 
capacity to coordinate NGOs 
effectively.
44% 1. Dominant role of donor 
NGOs leads to local actors 
coordinating more with 
NGOs than with government 
representatives.
2. High propensity for 
siloed operations and weak 
coordination between donors/
NGOs and DMD/NDMA leads to 
pressure on local actors.
3. Weak inter-pillar coordination 
at meetings leads to frustration 
among local actors.
4. At Level 1 disasters a lack of 









capacity of the 
then DMD and 
now NDMA.”
There remain significant concerns about 
SPOF in relation to the delivery of effective 
coordination during response phases. Some 
69% of interview respondents and three-
quarters (75%) of the respective practitioner 
feedback sessions produced identifiable SPOF 
in relation to DMD/NDMA coordination.
This is not to say that the former DMD and 
now NDMA have not amassed extensive 
experience and developed a comprehensive 
and often well-functioning pillar system to 
enhance the coordination of response across 
ministries and other governmental agencies, 
relevant participating NGOs and local 
authorities, actors and communities. Rather, 
specific SPOF were identified, some of which 
have more permanent resonance and some 
were attributed to procedural challenges and 
issues. Identified SPOF were centred around 
two major dimensions in relation to ministerial 
coordination and to coordination issues with 
NGOs and the private sector.
Challenges in Ministerial Coordination SPOF at 
the National Level:
• Ministries often viewed the DMD and now 
NDMA as a replacement rather than a 
coordination body in relation to disasters. 
The practitioner sessions recorded notable 
concerns about DMD/NDMA ‘mission 
creep’ compared to resourcing over 
time. Ministries often placed unrealistic 
expectations on the DMD/NDMA to deliver 
operational rather than coordination 
functions, which it was neither designed 
nor mandated to do. 69% of interview 
respondents highlighted how they saw 
the DMD, and now NDMA, as providing 
the lead in response provision akin to 
emergency responders and in providing 
functions and services that meant in 
practice that they were replacement bodies 
for weak ministerial action and capacity 
(see Table 3.12). The NDMA was often seen 
to, and expected to, fill the gaps during 
and after emergencies and to take over 
from what the ministries could and should 
provide. Moreover, the HR and resourcing 
limitations effectively restrict the capacity 
of the DMD and now NDMA to meet these 
gaps, prompting inappropriate criticism of 
the performance of the DMD/NDMA.
• Notable variations in the capacity and 
experiences within respective ministries 
towards disaster response and especially 
transition to recovery. This becomes a highly 
discernible SPOF during the transition 
from disaster response to recovery 
when government ministries are often 
required to take on the mantle of recovery 
strategies, operations and implementation. 
On many occasions this leads to delays in 
recovery due to the need to develop ad hoc 
procedures in the ministries to deal with 
recovery questions.
• Lack of effective coordination among 
ministries in the development of DRR 
strategies and planning. All the interview 
respondents that highlighted the SPOF 
in coordination also cited the example 
of coordination and implementation of 
existing laws on land ownership and 
transfer, urban planning regulation and 
implementation and enforcement of 
by-laws and sanitation rules as a clear 











Challenges in Ministerial Coordination SPOF 
at the Local Level. The national oriented SPOF 
in relation to ministerial coordination have 
implications for SPOF at the local level. Three 
specific SPOF were cited extensively during the 
focus groups and practitioner workshops:
• Weak DRR activities of ministries means 
they are not properly engaged with 
councillors and CDMCs in promoting DRR 
in communities at the time of disaster by 
many local actors. 
• Confusing role in disaster response. Often 
multiple levels of representation from 
differing ministries and government 
visiting disaster scenes leads to confusion 
among CDMCs and volunteers on chains of 
command.
• Weak contacts points for liaison with 
ministries and guidance from ministries 
that is often not clear or easily accessible 
for councillors, CDMCs and volunteers 
during onset of disasters leads to too 
many impromptu arrangements and an 
overreliance on personal contacts to liaise 
with ministries. 
Coordination of NGOs and Private Sector SPOF 
at the National Level. In general, coordination 
with NGOs and to a lesser extent the private 
sector was considered to be strong and well 
developed, honed through regular cooperation 
in pillar structures at times of disaster 
response and generally good consultation 
and participation of NGOs at DMD and 
NDMA meetings. Nevertheless, 44 per cent of 
interviewees and 50 per cent of practitioners’ 
feedback sessions identified specific potential 
and real SPOF that need further attention, 
including:
• Heavy reliance on donor NGOs to implement 
pillar operations during disasters.
• High propensity for siloed operations and 
weak communication between donors/
NGOs and DMD/NDMA.
• Weak inter-pillar coordination at meetings – 
often focusing on reporting back activity 
rather than agreeing and coordinating 
future activities.
• Limited capacity. At Level 1 disasters, local 
authorities designated with leading the 
response often have little capacity to 
coordinate NGOs effectively. There are 
routinely no dedicated staff available 
in many regions and a heavy reliance 
on volunteers who are often in a weak 
position to direct and coordinate NGO 
efforts.
Coordination of NGOs and Private Sector SPOF 
at the Local Level. The national oriented SPOF 
in relation to coordination with NGOs and the 
private sector have implications for SPOF at 
the local level. Specific SPOF cited extensively 
during the focus groups and practitioner 
workshops include:
• The dominant role of donor NGOs in 
implementing pillar operations during 
disasters leads to local actors coordinating 
more with NGOs than with government 
actors.
• Relationship Management. The high 
propensity for siloed operations and weak 
coordination between donors/NGOs and 
DMD/NDMA leads to pressures for local 
actors in maintaining cordial relations with 
all relevant partners.
• Weak inter-pillar coordination at meetings, 
often focusing on reporting back activity 
rather than agreeing and coordinating 
future activities, leads to frustration among 
local actors about slow or ineffective 
coordination and uncertainty about next 
steps affecting local communities.
• Limited capacity. At Level 1 disaster, the 
lack of local authorities’ capacity leads 




Table 3.13: Communication Challenges SPOF at the National and Local Levels
Sources: Data Collection Methods: National (Interviews, Practitioner Sessions and 
Workshops) and Local (Focus Groups and Workshops)















1. Lack of resilient and 
reliable internet connectivity 
inhibits coordination and 
communication particularly 
in the regions.
2. Over-reliance on private 
mobile phones to deliver 
coordination and messages 
among responders and 
public officials.
3. Power cuts and 
inconsistent power supply 
inhibit coordination. 
4. Reliance on old IT systems 
and Word/Excel packages for 
compiling key information 
leads to slow dissemination.
5. Weak usage of virtual 
platforms (Zoom, 
Teams, Skype) at inter-
pillar meetings inhibits 
participation of actors 
and effective and speedy 
coordination. 
75% 1. Highly varied abilities of local 
districts to access key guidance 
via internet, smart phone or 
website applications.
2. Strong reliance on private 
mobile phones by local actors 
to receive coordination and 
messages can be undermined by 
dead spots and expensive access 
to credits.  
3. Power cuts and unavailable/
inconsistent power supply inhibit 
coordination at scenes in many 
instances
4. Weak usage of virtual 
platforms (Zoom, Teams, Skype) 
at inter-pillar meetings inhibits 
participation of local actors and 
effective and speedy coordination 
of those not able to travel.
5. Absence of dedicated 
and equipped Emergency 
Operations Rooms (EORs) leads 
to poor coordination and weak 
engagement of local actors.
Communication & Technology Challenges SPOF 
at the National Level. Alongside coordination, 
there are consistent SPOF identified in the 
terms of the technological impediments to 
the delivery of crisis communications and 
coordination. Indeed, this was a consistent 
theme of three-quarters of interviewees 
(75%) and two-thirds (66%) of the practitioner 
feedback sessions. In particular, technical 
and procedural problems in terms of the 
delivery of effective crisis communications and 
coordination alongside hardware and physical 
deficiencies with ICT systems were identified 
as recurrent SPOF. More specifically, the 
physical deficiencies and SPOFs related to:
• The lack of resilient and reliable internet 
connectivity clearly inhibits coordination 
efforts and the delivery of crisis 
communications particularly in the 
provinces. There are also great variations 










regard with the Department of Public 
Health and Sanitation and NaCOVERC 
having relatively robust IT systems while 
other ministries suffer major incapacity 
and lack of connectivity.
• Equipment Limitations. The almost 
complete reliance on private mobile 
phones to deliver crisis communication 
and messages even among responders 
and public officials leads to system wide 
failures if networks are compromised or 
simply not functioning.
• Power cuts and inconsistent or unreliable 
power supplies alongside a widespread lack 
of available generators inhibit the ability 
to deliver consistent and timely crisis 
communication.
These physical SPOF are compounded and 
supplemented by widely cited procedural 
SPOFs in terms of crisis communication. Some 
75% of interviewees also cited:
• Poor maintenance provision and financing 
to keep systems updated, operational and 
online. Even when provision is secured, 
there are common issues with breakdowns.
• Reliance on old IT systems and Word/Excel 
software packages for compiling key 
information leads to slow compilation and 
dissemination of data and information to 
inform crisis communication.
Communication & Technology Challenges SPOF 
at the Local Level. The national oriented SPOF 
in relation to coordination have implications 
for SPOF at the local level. Specific SPOF 
cited extensively during the focus groups and 
practitioner workshops include:
• Highly varied abilities of local districts 
to access key guidance via internet, 
smart phone or website applications or 
communicate with national agencies and 
responders.
• Strong reliance on private mobile phones by 
local actors to receive coordination and 
messages can be undermined by dead 
spots and expensive access to credits.
• The lack or absence of dedicated, properly 
equipped Emergency Operations Rooms 
(EORs) in the regions and local areas 
means that coordination of response 
activities relies almost entirely on cheap 
yet unsophisticated virtual solutions 
like WhatsApp groups that have limited 
functionality. It also inhibits the use of 
virtual platforms by key local actors.
• Power cuts and unavailable/inconsistent 
power supply inhibit coordination at 






Points of Failure (SPOF)
This AFRICAB Final Report considers those 
SPOF that national and local disaster 
managers, policymakers and stakeholders in 
Sierra Leone have commonly identified as 
resolvable in the short and medium terms.
These resolvable SPOF represent ‘fixable’ 
areas of activity or policy. They are realistic 
points for future action that have a notable 
likelihood of producing significant impacts and 
enhancements to DM in the country. In simple 
terms, they frequently represent ‘quick wins’ 
for action that will produce disproportionately 
large and positive impacts on disaster 
management. On this basis, they are worthy of 
special attention in this AFRICAB Final Report.
General Observations
The research findings indicate that:
• There have been and continue to be 
notable improvements in many areas of 
DM in Sierra Leone in recent years. There 
is therefore a strong foundation on which 
to identify, refine and build so that those 
SPOF identified as resolvable can be ‘fixed’ 
at both the national and local levels.
• There are striking similarities in the views 
of participating national and local actors 
and stakeholders on resolvable SPOF 
and on where joint and comprehensive 
action will produce clear improvements in 
disaster management.
• These resolvable SPOF represent 
significant ‘windows of opportunity’ for 
future action since there is a general 
consensus among national and local actors 
on what is fixable and what needs to be 
done to fix them.
• Nevertheless, without further action, 
there is a strong likelihood for SPOF to 
continue that may result in detrimental 
and damaging breakdowns in part or all of 
the DM system in Sierra Leone.
• There is therefore an important 
opportunity cost if these resolvable areas 
are not attended to quickly and/or where 
existing actions are not continued and 








Resolvable (‘Fixable’) SPOF: The specific 
top ten most significant SPOF identified as 
resolvable and ‘fixable’ are presented in Table 
4.1. It is important to highlight that the data 
analysis undertaken using the SPOF Lens 
reveals that:
• There is a strong consensus in terms of 
commonly identified resolvable SPOF with 
six (60%) of the top ten areas featuring in 
both listings;
• There is also a similar level of 
prioritization in terms of resolvable SPOF. 
Four identified SPOF (80%) feature in the 
top five in both listings;
• It is only in terms of estimated time frames 
for achieving action that will fully resolve 
the SPOF that there were some differences. 
Local actors were broadly more pessimistic 
than national actors as to the ability to 
implement changes quickly that would 
‘achieve the fix’ and resolve the SPOF 
within a five-year time frame.
National Level District Level
Guides, SOPs and plans (81%) District resourcing (budgets)
HR resources, training & exercising (81%) Hazard profiling and risk assessment
DRR focus & EWS training (75%) Guides, SOPs and plans
Relations with districts (district coordination) 
(75%)
Common technologies (VHF phones, reliance 
on mobile phones) 
Crisis communication support and 
investment (68%)
DRR focus & EWS training
Managing volunteers (68%) Crisis communication training 
Leadership coordination (68%) DDMC/CDMC leadership training 
Leadership training (68%) Responders (Fire, Police)
Ministerial coordination (50%) Compliance and enforcement 
Communication & Technology (50%) Environmental issues (deforestation)
Table 4.1: Resolvable SPOF at National and District Levels
Residual (‘Partly Fixable’) SPOF: There is also 
strong agreement between national and local 
actors as to those SPOF that are residual or 
‘partly fixable’, presented in Table 4.2. These 
should be considered areas for future action 
that could be merited in terms of reducing the 
risk of likelihood of SPOF occurrence even if 
such actions would not result in the complete 
removal of the SPOF entirely. The research 
findings suggest that these identified SPOF 
areas are regarded as only partly fixable since 
they require significant increases in financial 
resourcing alongside a refocus in legislation, 
enhanced enforcement in terms of disaster 
management, governance and ultimately 
some behavioural change on the part of 
both stakeholders and the public at large. 
More specifically, there is a strong consensus 
that SPOF could be partly alleviated in three 
specific areas:
• Urban planning and enhanced 





• Protection of vulnerable groups;
• Logistical management and stockpiling.
These partly fixable SPOF are thus worthy 
of attention and focus as part of a national 
risk reduction strategy that will lead to some 
enhancement in DM governance and provision 
in the country.
Resistant (‘Unfixable’ SPOF): Table 4.3 shows 
those areas that were commonly regarded as 
resistant or ‘unfixable’ SPOF. They provide a 
‘reality check’ on what is commonly perceived 
National Level District Level
Critical infrastructure (road networks) (38%) District representation
Store management & stockpiling (38%) Resistance of local community to DRR
Logistics & funding of vulnerable groups 
(38%)
Logistics & funding of vulnerable groups 
Urban planning & compliance (38%) Local stockpiling
Table 4.2: Residual SPOF at National and District Levels
National Level District Level
Urban planning & compliance (50%) Critical infrastructure (road networks)
Critical infrastructure (road networks) (38%) Resistance of local populations 
Resistance of populations (88%) Registration of affected persons 
Registration of affected persons (88%) Legislative compliance & enforcement 
General law enforcement & compliance 
(68%)
Table 4.3: Resistant SPOF at National and District Levels
as the ‘art of the possible’ in Sierra Leone today. 
More importantly, they suggest that there 
remain significant limitations on the ability of 
both national and local stakeholders to achieve 
behavioural changes, especially among the 
general population, that would remove some 
SPOF completely.
From a policy making perspective, they 
highlight the importance of concentrating 
on those SPOF that are either ‘fixable’ or 






This AFRICAB Final Report offers eight main 
recommendations for future action that reflect 
a cross-cutting analysis of findings (see Table 
5.1). These recommendations reflect commonly 
identified areas of SPOF at both the national 
and local levels and have strong synergies and 
agreement on resolvability in the short term 
(less than 5 years). They also build upon areas 
where the DMD and NDMA have established a 
strong trajectory for existing and future action 
and thus where interventions are considered 
likely to have substantial positive impact.
Technical Revision/Enforcement of standards and codes – fire safety, urban 
planning codes and by-laws.
Coordination Ministerial, National-District, NGO/Private Sector.
Communication Media messages, media training and communication technologies.
Capacity Building Comprehensive DRR focus; EWS expansion and awareness.
Procedural Guides, SOPs, plans, risk matrices and registers, with increased 
emphasis on DDR and recovery, implementation and compliance.
Human Resources Investment and Training – HR capacity, competency, expertise, training 
and exercising.
Physical Infrastructure investments in stores and logistics, road and electricity 
networks; investments in district EORs.
Economic Dedicated DM funding at national and district levels; funding 
transitions from response to recovery phases.










Urgent revision and enhanced enforcement 
and prioritisation of existing technical 
standards. SPOF relate to missing or 
unenforced technical standards and codes in 
relation to fire safety, sanitation, storm drains 
1. A Working Coordination Group led by the NDMA should be established to coordinate a 
review of technical standards in relation to the implementation and enforcement of:
 a. Fire safety measures
 b. Proper management and regular clearance of storm drains and sewers
 c. Urban planning codes and by-laws.
The focus of this NDMA multi-agency Working Group is to develop and implement a 
new strategy for technical standards critical to effective DM. The Group and strategy will 
identify implementation and enforcement measures to remove logjams and blockages 
that lead to continued vulnerabilities of local communities. 
Technical Immediate Action Points:
and urban planning codes and by-laws. These 
lead to repeated vulnerabilities to fires, floods 
and landslips in many communities across 
Sierra Leone. These SPOF need immediate 
attention if there is to be enhanced resilience 
among local communities during both the dry 
and rainy seasons.
Coordination
AFRICAB research findings reveal major 
capacity deficiencies and a lack of expertise 
among many ministries at present in terms 
1. Creation of a ministerial DM governance support programme: this would seek to build 
and mentor DM capacities within the respective ministries (and NDMA) responsible for 
delivering DM related functions at all phases of the DM cycle;
2. A new National-District agreement that outlines the characteristics and implementation 
of national-district DM responsibilities that can inform the development of integrated 
local DM delivery units that can work alongside the NDMA and ministries at Levels 1, 2 
and 3 disasters and emergencies;
3. A new engagement policy with NGOs and the private sector to formally establish the 
parameters of NGO involvement in pillar frameworks established by the NDMA at 
times of crises, disasters and emergencies. While the value of NGO commitments and 
contributions is universally acknowledged, this new engagement policy should formally 
address and establish greater joint understanding of the rigours of NDMA and ministerial 
level coordination and interventions and the limitations of NGO involvement and 
funding which currently remain unclear in many instances. Too often, NGO coordination 
remains fragmented leading to NGO agendas being hard to coordinate with national DM 
planning.
Coordination Immediate Action Points:
of disaster management. SPOF were also 
commonly identified in the levels of national-
district coordination and in the over-reliance 
on, and challenge of coordinating with, the 




Issues of crisis communication are commonly 
seen as having the strong potential to 
become SPOF. This relates to issues of crisis 
communication policy development and 
coordination, including deficiencies in pre-
determined media messaging and weaknesses 
in the transmission of crisis communication 
messages between the national and local 
1. Further development of NDMA led multi-agency communication policy and guidance 
to encourage a culture of developing pre-disaster media messaging and social media 
engagement formats across the NDMA, ministries and local actors;
2. A stronger focus on creating and regularly updating directories of key contacts, focal 
and liaison points with full and relevant contact information that can be disseminated 
to stakeholders thus facilitating communication and coordination during DRR, response 
and recovery;
3. Development and delivery of a crisis communication and media management training 
programme;
4. New Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) with mobile networks and internet 
suppliers to further enhance NDMA, ministerial and responder prioritisation of access to 
mobile phones;
5. Enhancements in joint planning between DM actors and technology providers to ensure 
that the prevalence of communications ‘dead spots’ and the lack of mobile phone 
coverage in key areas of Sierra Leone are addressed as soon as possible.
Communication Immediate Action Points:
levels. There are also issues in terms of 
limitations in media communication training 
and social media engagement guidance 
among many DM officials at the national and 
particularly local levels. Further SPOF relate 
to the use and availability of communication 
networks and the heavy reliance on mobile 
networks by responders, stakeholders and even 
communities. 
Capacity Building
Recognition needs to be given to the fact that 
new funding and project initiatives aimed at 
enhancing the hydrological and meteorological 
EWS capacities of Sierra Leone are bearing 
1. Development of a multi-agency ‘National EWS technical dissemination’ training initiative, 
focused on building focal expert contact points in all ministries and agencies that have 
expertise in interpreting EWS-generated information and interpretations for application 
to their own respective policy domains;
2. Creation of a local EWS technical information programme to engage local disaster 
managers, delivery units of local authorities, DDMC and CDMC volunteers and tribal 
chiefs and local community leaders in all provinces. The aim is to further implement 
EWS engagement strategies so that technical understanding of flooding, fire and 
landslide data is better understood and can inform new local risk registers and local 
emergency action plans.
Capacity Building Immediate Action Points:
fruit in 2021. However, there must also be 
an acknowledgement that major SPOF exist 
in terms of the timely transmission of EWS 





Further enhanced updating and comprehensive 
review of plans, SOPs and guides is required. 
Presently there are many areas of response 
planning that rely upon draft plans that 
are often both in need of updating and not 
fully implemented. In addition, while the 
NDMA is making great efforts to enhance 
documentation and guidance in relation 
to DRR, there remain issues in terms of 
weaknesses in the regular updating of, and 
general lack of awareness, of risk matrices 
and risk registers that can guide planning 
1. NDMA Working Coordination Group established to develop implementation strategies for 
new national DRR plans and local DRR plans (as appropriate);
2. NDMA Working Coordination Group to develop implementation strategy for the 
promotion and development of a revised national risk register as well as local risk 
matrices and registers for the provincial and eventually district levels that can 
subsequently inform and lead to the completion of local emergency action plans. This 
group could build on the pioneering work done by the AFRICAB project in the case of 
Freetown in 2020-21;
3. NDMA to revise and develop a new Transition Planning Strategy to advise stakeholders 
on the aims, objectives, and parameters governing the smooth transition from response 
to recovery planning and actions. Particular attention would be paid to ensuring this 
strategy is developed in conjunction with other ministries, agencies, local authorities and 
NGOs to ensure smoother transitions in the future. 
Procedural Immediate Action Points:
and a lack of development for thresholds 
for interventions between Level 1, 2 and 3 
disasters. The situation is particularly acute 
in terms of the lack of comprehensive DRR 
plans, risk matrices and risk registers at 
the local level and the inevitable synergies 
between them. Equally, SOPs that can enhance 
implementation of DRR and response planning 
are often missing and require urgent action 
since stakeholders lack familiarity. There is 
also a particular SPOF in terms of addressing 
the need for developing ‘transition planning’ 
between response and recovery phases to 
avoid delays in the implementation of recovery 
efforts and to improve understanding of 





Comprehensive further investment is required 
in human resources in disaster management. 
While the establishment of a dedicated DM 
agency is a major step forward in Sierra Leone’s 
DM governance structures and the NDMA is 
already having a positive effect in terms of 
refining future agendas for and enhancing 
coordination of disaster management, 
there still remains a major ‘capacity versus 
expectations’ gap. As part of the 2020 
legislation, NDMA is now central to DM 
coordination across all phases of the DM cycle 
and has many legal responsibilities. There are 
mounting pressures and expectations that 
the new agency can deliver across DRR and 
mitigation, disaster preparedness and response 
as well as coordinating recovery activities. 
Moreover, there is a strong propensity for 
permissive ‘mission creep’. Many other units 
of government, including ministries, fall 
1. Funding strategies underpinning the new NDMA need to be carefully reviewed and 
managed to ensure that NDMA staffing is increased in line with rising responsibilities;
2. A comprehensive NDMA training policy, including career development mapping, 
should be devised to expand training and exercising opportunities on an annual basis 
among staff of the NDMA and key ministries likely to be involved in DM activities. The 
development of multi-agency cooperation and expertise should be supported across the 
range of hazards and along the sectoral-specific elements of disaster management. The 
NDMA training policy should also allow for formal career development and mentoring of 
staff to enable them to acquire formal DM qualifications that will build a specialist DM 
cohort of trainers for the future among NDMA and selected stakeholders;
3. Local delivery unit support and development policy. It is essential that a new national 
policy aimed at fostering local delivery units in DM among the local authorities is 
developed. This will help to address key SPOF in the ability of local authorities to lead 
on Level 1 designated disasters, effectively supporting the vital but hard-pressed work 
of the NDMA and enhancing coordination and capacity building with local DDMCs and 
CDMCs;
4. Expansion in technical assistance training for DDMCs’ and CDMCs’ leadership and 
volunteers. Building on the best practice work developed in the Freetown area (see Miles 
et al, 2020; FCC 2021) in terms of Level 1 disaster training for all Councillors, DDMCs 
and CDMCs, the potential for expansion to all provinces of Sierra Leone should be taken 
forward.
Human Resources Immediate Action Points:
back and rely too easily on NDMA to deliver 
activities that are normally associated with 
their respective ministerial remits but which 
presently they lack the inclination, capacity 
or capability to deliver themselves. This 
propensity for ‘mission creep’ must also be 
set against the finite capacity of the NDMA. 
Whilst the NDMA senior leadership is highly 
experienced, it is small in size, and the number 
of dedicated NDMA staff is limited.  There are 
also notable needs to, as a bare minimum, 
expand the training and exercise experience 
of all staff and, at best, to provide career 
development opportunities for them to secure 
dedicated disaster management-related 
expertise and academic qualifications. Severe 
and scalable SPOF exist at present in terms of 
the ability of the small, yet highly experienced 
and very dedicated staff of the NDMA to handle 
simultaneous and/or multiple disaster events, 
especially if they are occurring in different 
parts of the country. 
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Physical
Addressing infrastructure issues that lead to 
repetitive and enhanced vulnerabilities to 
disasters. In terms of immediate resolvability, 
attention should be given to enhancing 
physical assets such as warehouse and 
logistics management and effective local 
emergency operations rooms (EORs) for 
priority planning and investment. Issues 
with warehouse and logistical management 
were regularly cited as problems, particularly 
at local level. This relates primarily to the 
stockpiling of assets (eg fire extinguishers, 
first aid kits, tools, sandbags etc) among local 
1. Development of an implementation strategy for local stockpiling and store management. 
Building on the substantial improvement of the DMD/NDMA capacity in terms of 
logistical management, attention needs to be focused on encouraging local stockpiling, 
physically secure storage and warehouse management strategies at the local level. Local 
catalogues of assets need to be drawn up among local communities across the country 
to detail the parameters of their community resilience;
2. Investment in the NDMA national emergency operations rooms and alongside this, 
investments in establishing effective local emergency operations rooms (beyond 
virtual provisions like emergency WhatsApp groups) need to be prioritized to create 
an integrated framework for improved situational awareness in the country (see Miles, 
2021);
3. Increased strategic capacity-building in responders. Continuing investment to enhance 
the physical equipment levels of the NFF and SLP needs to be increased. There remains 
a pressing need to modernize responders’ capabilities and address capacity gaps, such as 
in HAZMAT equipment. This is especially acute outside Freetown;
4. A new NDMA MOU and strategy focusing on encouraging greater cooperation with the 
country’s electricity suppliers needs to be achieved as a matter of priority. This strategy 
should focus on new implementation measures to enhance robustness, system resilience 
and fire prevention capacities. This could involve consideration of developing new 
innovative public-private partnerships (PPPs) and relationships in accordance with the 
UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction;
5. Fresh engagement with a view to developing a sustainable road planning and building 
strategy that fully and specifically accommodates the demands of meeting the ever-
increasing DM challenges and climate change conditions. The views and priorities of key 
responders, delivery of response and relief efforts to vulnerable communities and areas 
need to feature more prominently in impact and needs assessments for road planning 
and building in the future. 
Physical Immediate Action Points:
communities across the country to enhance 
their self-reliance, especially given the SPOF 
relating to the ability of NDMA and responders 
to attend scenes quickly in many parts of the 
country. A commonly cited SPOF regarding 
wider physical issues relates to the road and 
electricity networks, in which an enhanced 
focus on inter-ministerial coordination 
to address these issues is of paramount 
importance. Also of concern is the need to 
develop a new inter-ministerial strategy for 
enhancing the safety of local electrical supply 
systems that are becoming a major and regular 
source of fire outbreaks across urban areas of 





Developing dedicated DM funding provisions 
at national and local levels. At present 
planning thresholds in terms of the declaration 
of Level 1, 2 or 3 disaster events, where they 
exist, are not accompanied by complementary 
financial planning and provision. Nor are any 
forms of transitional planning from response 
to recovery balanced with prior financial 
planning or understanding of obligations. This 
means that even at the national level, planning 
of contingencies to handle escalations of 
disasters is not matched by funding provisions. 
1. Revision of ‘Criteria for Declarations of Emergencies and Thresholds for NDMA 
Interventions’ to help direct future contingency funding arrangements and priorities;
2. Establishment of formal guidance, requiring the establishment of dedicated DM 
contingency funds at both the national and provincial levels. Where funds may already 
exist then reviews of guidance for stakeholders, actors and even NGOs to apply for such 
funding in a timely manner for quicker utilization should be developed;
3. Greater coordinated thinking is required between the development of thresholds and 
formal classifications and funding arrangements embodied in a new integrated strategy;
4. Formal funding allocations to support DRR at the national level should be developed 
and provided for on an ongoing basis to highlight the shift to an enhanced DRR focus;
5. New planning initiatives should be implemented aimed at financing smoother 
transitions between response and recovery.
Economic Immediate Action Points:
At the moment, they are dealt with, in many 
instances on a piecemeal and case by case 
basis. There is also a reflex to rely heavily 
on external NGOs for funding and to draw 
upon budgeted external programmes and 
plans given the lack of systemic transparent 
contingency planning at the governmental 
level. The situation is particularly pressing at 
the local level.  The lack of dedicated DM funds 
as part of local authority budgeting leads to 
major SPOF in local capacities and planning 
for handling disaster incidents within their 
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